Chinese Hacked Exploit Juniper Networks Routers to Implant Backdoor


Cybersecurity researchers have uncovered a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign targeting critical network infrastructure, marking a significant evolution in tactics by Chinese state-sponsored hackers.

Mandiant, a leading cybersecurity firm, has discovered multiple custom backdoors deployed on Juniper Networks‘ routers, attributing the activity to a Chinese espionage group known as UNC3886.

The backdoors provided attackers with persistent access to compromised networks while actively evading detection mechanisms.

In mid-2024, Mandiant discovered threat actors had deployed custom backdoors on Juniper Networks’ Junos OS routers, which form critical components of many organizational network infrastructures.

The APT Hackers attributed these backdoors to UNC3886, a highly skilled China-nexus cyber espionage group with a history of targeting network devices and virtualization technologies, particularly within defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations across the US and Asia.

Mandiant worked with Juniper Networks to investigate the activity and determined that the affected Juniper MX routers were running end-of-life hardware and software, making them particularly vulnerable to compromise.

The discovery builds upon Mandiant’s previous reports of UNC3886’s similar malware ecosystems deployed on virtualization technologies and network edge devices in 2022 and 2023.

This latest campaign demonstrates UNC3886’s continued focus on maintaining long-term access to victim networks while showing deep understanding of the underlying technology of targeted appliances.

Sophisticated TINYSHELL-Based Backdoors with Custom Capabilities

Mandiant’s investigation identified six distinct malware samples across multiple compromised Juniper MX routers.

Each sample was a modified version of a TINYSHELL backdoor – a lightweight backdoor written in C that communicates using a custom binary protocol – but with unique capabilities specifically designed for Junos OS.

The backdoors were cleverly disguised with names mimicking legitimate Juniper system processes, including “appid,” “to,” “irad,” “lmpad,” “jdosd,” and “oemd”.

The attackers demonstrated significant technical sophistication by circumventing Juniper’s Verified Exec (veriexec) protection system, which normally prevents unauthorized code execution.

UNC3886 achieved this by injecting malicious code into the memory of legitimate processes.

The backdoors incorporated both active variants that would initiate communication with command and control servers, and passive variants that would remain dormant until receiving specific network triggers.

Perhaps most concerning was the inclusion of code specifically designed to disable logging mechanisms on the target devices, effectively erasing evidence of the attackers’ activities.

Implications and Recommendations for Network Security

The compromises highlight a concerning trend of espionage-motivated adversaries targeting routing infrastructure, which typically lacks robust security monitoring solutions such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) agents.

This activity grants attackers long-term, high-level access to crucial routing infrastructure, with potential for more disruptive actions in the future.

Mandiant has issued several recommendations for organizations to protect themselves.

First and foremost, organizations should upgrade their Juniper devices to the latest software images released by Juniper Networks, which include mitigations and updated signatures for the Juniper Malware Removal Tool (JMRT).

After upgrading, organizations should run the JMRT Quick Scan and Integrity Check.

Additional recommendations include implementing robust multi-factor authentication, granular access control for network devices, enhanced monitoring of administrative activities, prioritizing vulnerability management, implementing a device lifecycle management program, strengthening security posture through access controls and segmentation, and leveraging threat intelligence to improve security controls.

As network infrastructure continues to be targeted by sophisticated threat actors, organizations must remain vigilant and proactive in their security measures to protect these critical systems that form the backbone of digital communications.

Indicators of Compromise

Host-Based Indicators

Filename Malware Family MD5 SHA1 SHA256
appid TINYSHELL 2c89a18944d3a895bd6432415546635e 50520639cf77df0c15cc95076fac901e3d04b708 98380ec6bf4e03d3ff490cdc6c48c37714450930e4adf82e6e14d244d8373888
irad TINYSHELL aac5d83d296df81c9259c9a533a8423a 1a6d07da7e77a5706dd8af899ebe4daa74bbbe91 5bef7608d66112315eefff354dae42f49178b7498f994a728ae6203a8a59f5a2
jdosd TINYSHELL 8023d01ffb7a38b582f0d598afb974ee 06a1f879da398c00522649171526dc968f769093 c0ec15e08b4fb3730c5695fb7b4a6b85f7fe341282ad469e4e141c40ead310c3
lmpad TINYSHELL 5724d76f832ce8061f74b0e9f1dcad90 f8697b400059d4d5082eee2d269735aa8ea2df9a 5995aaff5a047565c0d7fe3c80fa354c40e7e8c3e7d4df292316c8472d4ac67a
oemd TINYSHELL e7622d983d22e749b3658600df00296d cf7af504ef0796d91207e41815187a793d430d85 905b18d5df58dd6c16930e318d9574a2ad793ec993ad2f68bca813574e3d854b
to TINYSHELL b9e4784fa0e6283ce6e2094426a02fce 01735bb47a933ae9ec470e6be737d8f646a8ec66 e1de05a2832437ab70d36c4c05b43c4a57f856289224bbd41182deea978400ed
oemd TINYSHELL bf80c96089d37b8571b5de7cab14dd9f cec327e51b79cf11b3eeffebf1be8ac0d66e9529 3751997cfcb038e6b658e9180bc7cce28a3c25dbb892b661bcd1065723f11f7e
lmpad TINYSHELL 3243e04afe18cc5e1230d49011e19899 2e9215a203e908483d04dfc0328651d79d35b54f 7ae38a27494dd6c1bc9ab3c02c3709282e0ebcf1e5fcf59a57dc3ae56cfd13b4

Network Indicators

Description Indicator
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 129.126.109.50:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 116.88.34.184:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 223.25.78.136:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 45.77.39.28:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 101.100.182.122:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 118.189.188.122:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 158.140.135.244:22
TINYSHELL Command and Control server 8.222.225.8:22

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