Google Researchers Use Mach IPC to Uncover Sandbox Escape Vulnerabilities

Google Project Zero researchers have uncovered new sandbox escape vulnerabilities in macOS using an innovative approach that leverages Mach Interprocess Communication (IPC) mechanisms-core components of Apple’s operating system.

Their public research details how low-level message passing between privileged and sandboxed processes can be a dangerous attack vector, and offers open-source tools and code for the infosec community to replicate their work.

Modern operating systems, including macOS, use “sandboxes” to restrict what applications can do-especially those downloaded from the internet or rendering potentially untrusted content.

These sandboxes limit system access, containing exploits that might otherwise lead to severe security breaches. However, for sophisticated attackers, escaping these sandboxes is a coveted goal, enabling privilege elevation or broader system compromise.

Mach IPC: The Unseen Gatekeeper

At the heart of macOS is Mach IPC, a foundation-level message-passing system used by system daemons (highly privileged background processes) and applications.

Many daemons accept hundreds of IPC messages per second, some from unprivileged or sandboxed processes, creating potential bridges for attackers.

The Project Zero team specifically targeted coreaudiod, a complex and privileged system daemon responsible for audio hardware management, highlighting the com.apple.audio.audiohald Mach service as a promising attack vector.

They discovered that IPC message handlers, if improperly validated, could process malicious inputs originating from sandboxes.

Instead of relying solely on automated tools, Google’s researchers used knowledge-driven fuzzing-a method that combines manual reverse-engineering with traditional fuzzing:

1. Identifying Attack Vectors: They examined which Mach services are accessible from sandboxed processes by analyzing sandbox profiles and using tools like sbtool.
2. Choosing Targets: They filtered the vast list of daemons to those with significant privileges and accessible Mach services.
3. Fuzzing Harness Creation: They built a custom harness that could load the CoreAudio framework and invoke message handlers directly, thus allowing targeted and high-coverage fuzzing.
4. Type Confusion in coreaudiod: The team found a critical type confusion vulnerability in coreaudiod, allowing crafted messages to cause out-of-bounds memory access-a potential avenue for escaping the sandbox and escalating privileges.
5. Dynamic Analysis Tools: Their open-source fuzzing harness and tools, designed for modularity, empower the broader security community to continue probing macOS services.

Sandbox escapes are some of the most sought-after vulnerabilities by malicious actors and security researchers alike.

By focusing on Mach IPC, Google’s research has highlighted a systemic risk area and encouraged Apple and the broader ecosystem to rethink interprocess message validation.

Google Project Zero has published the full technical breakdown, sample code, and their custom harness for peer review and community use.

Their work not only leads to more secure Apple devices but also raises the bar for defensive research globally.

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