Custom Active Directory Extensions Create Stealthy Backdoors for Corporate Attacks

Active Directory (AD) Group Policy Objects (GPOs) are a cornerstone of centralized management for Windows environments, enabling administrators to configure operating systems, applications, and user settings across all domain-connected machines.

The real work of applying these policies on client machines is handled by Client-Side Extensions (CSEs)—specialized dynamic link libraries (DLLs) that interpret and enforce GPO settings.

Each CSE is uniquely identified by a Globally Unique Identifier (GUID) and registered in the Windows Registry under:

textHKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonGPExtensions

Administrators and attackers alike can enumerate CSEs using PowerShell:

powershellGet-ChildItem "HKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonGPExtensions" | 
    Select-Object @{Name="GUID";Expression={$_.PSChildName}}, @{Name="Name";Expression={$_.GetValue('')}}

The proper application of a GPO depends on the presence and correct registration of the CSE both on the client and within the GPO’s attributes (gPCMachineExtensionNames or gPCUserExtensionNames).

If these are misconfigured, policy enforcement fails.

Crafting and Registering a Malicious Custom CSE

While defenders are familiar with attacks leveraging built-in CSEs (such as those for Scheduled Tasks or File deployment), attackers can dramatically increase stealth by creating custom CSEs with unknown GUIDs.

This approach is not widely documented, making detection significantly harder1.

Minimal Malicious CSE DLL

A custom CSE can be created in C++ using Visual Studio.

The DLL must export a function named ProcessGroupPolicy, which the Group Policy engine will call.

Here’s a simplified code snippet:

cpp// advshcore.def
LIBRARY "advshcore"
EXPORTS
    ProcessGroupPolicy
    DllRegisterServer PRIVATE
    DllUnregisterServer PRIVATE

cpp// dllmain.cpp (partial)
DWORD CALLBACK ProcessGroupPolicy(
    DWORD dwFlags,
    HANDLE hToken,
    HKEY hKeyRoot,
    PGROUP_POLICY_OBJECT pDeletedGPOList,
    PGROUP_POLICY_OBJECT pChangedGPOList,
    ASYNCCOMPLETIONHANDLE pHandle,
    BOOL* pbAbort,
    PFNSTATUSMESSAGECALLBACK pStatusCallback)
{
    LogToFile(TEXT("ProcessGroupPolicy called"));
    LogExecutionContext();
    return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}

After compiling, the attacker registers the DLL with:

textregsvr32 "advshcore.dll"

The registry is updated to link the custom GUID to the DLL and associate it with the necessary GPO attributes.

Registry Settings for CSE

Deployment, Detection, and Defense

Once registered and linked to a GPO, the custom CSE executes with SYSTEM privileges during every Group Policy refresh—every 5 minutes on domain controllers and every 90 minutes on member machines.

Attackers can distribute the DLL via SYSVOL shares or use Group Policy Preferences to copy and register the DLL on multiple endpoints.

However, this technique leaves traces that vigilant defenders can monitor:

• Event ID 5145: Detects write access to SYSVOL, signaling potential DLL drops.
• Event ID 4688: Monitors process creation, such as regsvr32 or startup scripts.
• Event ID 5136: Flags unauthorized changes to GPO attributes like gPCMachineExtensionNames.

Detection Points for Custom CSE Abuse

The Need for Proactive Monitoring

Custom CSE abuse represents a stealthy and persistent backdoor method in AD environments.

Because these extensions run as trusted SYSTEM processes and use native Windows mechanisms, they are difficult to detect with traditional security tools.

Continuous monitoring of GPO changes, CSE registrations, and related event logs is essential for defending against this advanced attack vector.

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