Buterat Backdoor Campaigns Targeting Enterprise Endpoint Control

Buterat Backdoor Campaigns Targeting Enterprise Endpoint Control

Backdoor malware is a covert type of malicious software designed to bypass standard authentication mechanisms and provide persistent, unauthorized access to compromised systems.

Unlike conventional malware that prioritizes immediate damage or data theft, backdoors focus on stealth and longevity, enabling attackers to control infected endpoints remotely, deploy additional payloads, exfiltrate sensitive information, and move laterally across networks with minimal detection.

The Buterat backdoor is a notable example of this threat class, known for its sophisticated persistence techniques and adaptive communication methods with remote command-and-control (C2) servers.

First identified in targeted attacks against enterprise and government networks, Buterat commonly spreads through phishing campaigns, malicious attachments, or trojanized software downloads.

Once executed, it disguises its processes under legitimate system tasks, modifies registry keys for persistence, and uses encrypted or obfuscated communication channels to avoid network-based detection

Static and Dynamic Analysis

A preliminary static analysis using ExeInfo PE reveals that the sample contains numerous encrypted and obfuscated strings designed to hide execution flow and API calls for downloading or executing malicious files on the infected host. The sample’s file hashes are:

  • MD5: 5d73aad06259533c238f0cdb3280d5a8.
  • SHA-1: 6a1c418664fe5214c8e3d2f8f5020e1cb4311584.
  • SHA-256: f50ec4cf0d0472a3e40ff8b9d713fb0995e648ecedf15082a88b6e6f1789cdab.
  • Imphash: 3a1c6ade174e0b7afaa15737bba99cab.

Compiled with Borland Delphi, the backdoor’s entry point lies at 0x00410AD8, where user-mode code execution begins.

Static Analysis using ExeInfo PE tool.

Dynamic analysis uncovers multiple obfuscated API calls, including SetThreadContext and ResumeThread.

The SetThreadContext API provides attackers with precise control over thread execution, enabling hijacking of existing threads without altering process entry points—ideal for stealthy payload delivery and evasion of lightweight behavioral detection.

Execution Flow diagram.
Execution Flow diagram.

ResumeThread then reactivates these manipulated threads, facilitating execution of injected code with minimal anomaly footprints.

During infection, Buterat drops several executables into the C:UsersAdmin directory—namely amhost.exe, bmhost.exe, cmhost.exe, dmhost.exe, and lqL1gG.exe—each serving as secondary loaders or persistence agents.

Upon execution, Buterat attempts to contact a remote C2 server disguised behind the subdomain ginomp3.mooo.com.

Its communication channel employs encryption and obfuscation layers to thwart network inspection and intrusion detection systems.

By tunneling commands and payloads through HTTPS-like handshakes and using randomized timing intervals, the backdoor can blend C2 traffic into legitimate outbound flows.

The malware also leverages Windows legitimate system tasks—renaming its processes to mimic Windows Update or system host services—further reducing suspicion from endpoint protection platforms.

Endpoint Protection: Deploy up-to-date anti-malware and antivirus solutions capable of behavioral analysis to detect obfuscated API calls and thread injection techniques.

Files Dropped during infection.
Files Dropped during infection.

Network Monitoring: Implement traffic analysis tools and network anomaly detection to flag suspicious connections to domains such as ginomp3.mooo.com.

Firewall & IDS: Configure firewalls to block unauthorized outbound connections and IDS rules to alert on SetThreadContext and ResumeThread usage patterns outside normal baselines.

System Integrity Monitoring: Use file integrity monitoring to detect unexpected file creations or modifications in user directories, especially for executables named amhost.exe, bmhost.exe, cmhost.exe, dmhost.exe, and lqL1gG.exe.

Application Allowlisting: Restrict execution to approved binaries, preventing dropped payloads from running.

Behavioral Analysis: Choose security platforms with memory analysis capabilities to identify live thread injections and code modifications in running processes.

Employee Training & Awareness: Educate staff on recognizing phishing emails and trojanized software downloads; encourage verification of attachments and downloads against official vendor sources.

Integrating Point Wild’s Lat61 Platform

Point Wild’s unified security platform, Lat61, offers integrated endpoint protection, network monitoring, and threat intelligence.

The Lat61 Threat Intelligence Team actively tracks Buterat’s evolving infrastructure and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), feeding real-time updates into detection rules and response workflows.

The Backdoor.Win32.Buterat malware demonstrates a highly stealthy and persistent infection methodology designed to maintain long-term unauthorized access to compromised systems.

By leveraging encrypted strings, obfuscated API calls like SetThreadContext, and sophisticated thread manipulation techniques, it effectively bypasses standard behavioral detection mechanisms.

Its capability to drop multiple payloads and establish encrypted C2 communication amplifies its threat potential, enabling attackers to execute arbitrary commands, exfiltrate sensitive data, and expand their foothold within enterprise networks.

Timely detection, proactive threat hunting, and comprehensive endpoint and network defenses are essential to mitigate the risk posed by Buterat and similar backdoor threats.

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About Cybernoz

Security researcher and threat analyst with expertise in malware analysis and incident response.