Authentication coercion represents a sophisticated and evolving threat targeting Windows and Active Directory environments across organizations globally.
This attack method exploits the fundamental communication mechanisms embedded within every Windows operating system, manipulating machines into automatically transmitting sensitive credentials to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
The emergence of this threat vector reflects a significant shift in how threat actors adapt their strategies to bypass increasingly sophisticated defense mechanisms.
The attack’s sophistication lies in its ability to leverage legitimate Windows functionality against itself. Attackers establish malicious listeners designed to appear as trusted resources within an organization’s network.
When a compromised or targeted machine attempts to connect to what it believes is a legitimate server, it automatically sends hashed credentials to the attacker.
This process occurs through Remote Procedure Call (RPC) functions, which serve as the backbone for inter-process communication across Windows and Active Directory infrastructure.
The attack requires no special permissions, making it accessible to threat actors operating with minimal technical expertise once proof-of-concept tools become available.
Recent threat intelligence indicates this attack method poses significant risks due to its widespread exploitation capabilities.
Palo Alto Networks security analysts identified authentication coercion techniques being weaponized through rare and lesser-known RPC protocols, allowing attackers to evade traditional detection mechanisms.
The security researchers noted this represents a concerning trend where threat actors deliberately misuse obscure RPC functions to avoid triggering conventional monitoring alerts.
The technical mechanics of authentication coercion center on RPC message protocols and their parameter handling.
.webp "Authentication Coercion Attack Tricks Windows Machines into Revealing Credentials to Attack-controlled Servers 3")
Remote Procedure Call functions are designed for both local and remote system communication, with many accepting Universal Naming Convention (UNC) paths as parameters.
When attackers craft malicious RPC requests containing attacker-controlled UNC paths, the targeted machine’s automatic authentication behavior becomes weaponized.
For instance, the ElfrOpenBELW function within the MS-EVEN EventLog Remoting Protocol can be exploited in this manner, though this particular interface rarely appears in normal organizational network traffic.
Authentication coercion mechanisms
A detailed analysis of authentication coercion mechanisms reveals multiple exploitation vectors through different protocols.
The MS-RPRN Print System Remote Protocol, MS-EFSR Encrypting File System Remote Protocol, MS-DFSNM Distributed File System Namespace Management Protocol, and MS-FSRVP File Server Remote VSS Protocol all present exploitable opnums that threat actors leverage.
.webp "Authentication Coercion Attack Tricks Windows Machines into Revealing Credentials to Attack-controlled Servers 4")
Well-documented tools including PrinterBug, PrintNightmare, PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, and ShadowCoerce demonstrate how readily available exploit frameworks simplify execution of these attacks.
The impact of successful authentication coercion extends far beyond simple credential theft. Organizations face complete domain compromise scenarios where attackers steal NTLM hashes of critical infrastructure including Domain Controllers and Certificate Authority servers.
These credentials enable lateral movement, privilege escalation through DCSync attacks, and establishment of persistent access mechanisms.
In documented incidents, threat actors have executed NTLM relay attacks leveraging stolen machine account hashes against certificate authorities, creating pathways for long-term persistence and sensitive data exfiltration.
Organizations must implement robust detection strategies focusing on anomalous RPC traffic patterns, including unusual source-destination combinations, suspicious UNC path parameters, and calls targeting rarely-used interfaces.
Critical preventive measures include enforcing SMB signing across domains, disabling unused RPC services on critical assets, implementing Extended Protection for Authentication, and utilizing Windows RPC filters through netsh utilities.
Modern endpoint detection and response platforms provide behavioral analysis capabilities essential for identifying these subtle attack patterns before successful credential harvesting occurs.
Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X to Get More Instant Updates, Set CSN as a Preferred Source in Google.
