Everest hacking group has allegedly claimed a major breach of Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., raising fresh concerns about data security at large automotive manufacturers.
According to early reports, the cybercrime group says it exfiltrated around 900 GB of sensitive data from the Japanese carmaker, a volume that suggests broad access to internal systems and repositories.
While the full scope of the compromise is still unclear, the incident highlights how ransomware and data theft crews continue to target global supply chains and high-value industrial data.
Initial signs of the intrusion surfaced on underground forums, where the group reportedly shared proof-of-compromise samples to support its claims.
These samples may include internal documents, engineering files, or customer-related records, although this has not yet been confirmed.
Analysts note that such leaks often serve as pressure tactics in double-extortion schemes, where attackers both encrypt and threaten to publish data.
Hackmanac analysts identified the alleged breach and issued an early cyberattack alert, flagging Nissan’s manufacturing operations in Japan as the primary focus and warning that the incident remains under verification.
From an attack vector standpoint, the activity appears aligned with common tactics used by data-theft-first groups that seek initial access via exposed remote services, stolen VPN credentials, or phishing campaigns.
Once inside, threat actors typically move laterally, map the network, and hunt for file servers, code repositories, and backup infrastructure.
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In many such cases, they deploy custom scripts to automate the collection and staging of high-value data before exfiltration.
While it could represent a sample leak page used to showcase stolen files and directories to potential buyers or to pressure the victim.
Suspected Data Exfiltration Workflow
While technical indicators for this specific Nissan incident are still emerging, the broader Everest playbook suggests a structured data exfiltration pipeline that defenders can study and emulate in lab simulations.
After gaining a foothold on a compromised host, the malware or operator scripts usually enumerate mounted shares and accessible drives, building a target list of paths such as finance servers, engineering shares, and document management systems.
A simplified PowerShell-style enumeration routine could look like:-
Get-SmbShare | ForEach-Object {
Get-ChildItem "\$env:COMPUTERNAME$_" -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Length -gt 5MB } |
Out-File "C:ProgramDatatarget_files.txt" -Append
}
In many campaigns, attackers then compress staged data into archives and exfiltrate it over HTTPS or via anonymizing tunnels to command-and-control servers, often blending with normal outbound traffic.
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