New “Punishing Owl” Hacker Group Targets Networks Linked to Russian Security Agency


A previously unknown threat actor calling itself Punishing Owl has claimed responsibility for breaching a Russian government security agency, marking the emergence of what cybersecurity researchers believe is a new politically motivated hacktivist collective.

The attack demonstrated sophisticated operational security capabilities beyond typical data exfiltration campaigns.

On the same day as the breach announcement, Punishing Owl leveraged administrative access to the victim’s DNS infrastructure, creating a subdomain that redirected users to attacker-controlled servers hosted in Brazil.

The group configured legitimate-appearing TLS certificates and established IMAP and SMTP services on these servers, creating a convincing replica of the victim’s infrastructure to facilitate credential harvesting and further social engineering.

On December 12, 2025, the group published evidence of the intrusion, including stolen internal documents hosted on a DLS website and duplicated across Mega.nz repositories.

The timing of the disclosure Friday at 6:37 PM appears strategically chosen to minimize response windows from Russian security services and maximize public visibility of the compromise.

Secondary Attack Campaign

In the days following the initial announcement, Punishing Owl launched a coordinated email campaign targeting the victim’s business partners and contractors.

Emails claiming to originate from the group and later from the victim’s employees were dispatched from the same Brazilian infrastructure, directing recipients to the modified DNS records and encouraging them to open password-protected archives.

DLS resource with victim files (Source : Positive Technologies).

These malicious ZIP files contained LNK files masquerading as PDFs via double-extension obfuscation.

When executed, the files triggered PowerShell commands downloading ZipWhisper, a custom stealer written in PowerShell designed to extract web browser data, credentials, and cached authentication tokens.

The stealer packaged exfiltrated data into ZIP archives and uploaded them to command-and-control servers via HTTP POST requests.


Malicious ZIP archive (Source : Positive Technologies).
Malicious ZIP archive (Source : Positive Technologies).

The group’s C2 domain, bloggoversikten[.]com (82.221.100[.]40), impersonated a Russian-language technical blog a domain legitimately operated until 2015 and dormant until its re-registration in 2025.

Analysis of the stealer code revealed timestamps suggesting the use of AI-assisted code generation, indicating the group may lack extensive malware development expertise but possesses sufficient resources to leverage modern development tools.

Attribution and Victimology

Punishing Owl’s targeting footprint exclusively encompasses Russian critical infrastructure, with confirmed victims including government agencies, research institutions, and IT organizations.

Social media data about the group's account (Source : Positive Technologies).
Social media data about the group’s account (Source : Positive Technologies).

Multiple social media and darknet marketplace accounts were registered simultaneously in December 2025, suggesting the group is establishing its cybercriminal brand deliberately.

Geolocation data indicates group administration from Kazakhstan, though this requires independent verification.

Security researchers assess that Punishing Owl represents a broader trend of politically motivated hacktivist collectives emerging amid escalating geopolitical tensions.

The group’s sophisticated operational tradecraft, custom malware development, and sustained infrastructure investments suggest this campaign extends beyond a one-off publicity stunt.

Continued monitoring of the group’s activities remains essential for organizations operating in the Russian threat landscape.

Indicators of compromise

CategoryMD5SHA1SHA256
ZIP Archive99ed9a3126f72ec70975a3d6246130e085a8d1b54b294a01089948573fce7c0059b8b2b194b93f4540f01956895a74d2c0b54e502f2be299e4d2ea0a3cc639619377f229
LNK Loader #1b72c550737ef4fbf74b529d1a1b33569d10818d99a616720f6d061b95659d34bbc57582137f307b378c028afa67a236a05224e367ed486ab3ab2f7c3e13518d0823e137d
LNK Loader #2bbf0b95372c89eada433b41eeef5f76164f1a24f2f81632329e84a30b15ca8a74b5478c3dfd49ea1911fb7e800440c82b6518828ec7fa7c595d7ea6baabec29e5d9cecec
ZipWhisper Styler #107807a7da277184539e35126f1ab3baed24e8f21cbe4dcd573aaa914c41df8609c5d3f4709636fbca343f268ee7c0c033e37a9b007fe40ce914c4273ed961d84b52bed17
ZipWhisper Styler #25db00ab3e6875c14cf550b1e7c66431083fdfe08206a05c85833873576653d0802883d9eb1782f8f3440ce4b184f27c4047439aa998058ec17319a5b08031eda545d5a50
ZipWhisper Styler #38027ca72007f5b4a270ab8230c7b5bf5a82eb95e60f084c261f88d60aff1cee30602552ff25506f5a7f3580edae159bbdbca3f8d17dfeeaadcc548c8202a764399550778
ZipWhisper Styler #433c78c7126ae56040f04de4df4139acb8deffa9765915a57e9679f4481dac43dabbbcecd6aa09062a755775e1b11dfd5fa80981fa50e1ecf4ba3f1ae41b2ed8b671e0f6a

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