Cybersecurity researchers have identified a resurgence of SpyNote malware campaigns targeting Android users through sophisticated fake Google Play Store websites.
The malicious actor behind these attacks has implemented new anti-analysis techniques and expanded their deceptive tactics since previous reports, demonstrating a persistent threat to mobile device security.
Deceptive Campaign Hits Popular Apps
The threat actor continues to operate fake Google Play Store pages that perfectly mimic legitimate app installation interfaces using copied HTML and CSS code.
These deceptive websites target users seeking popular applications across multiple categories, including social media platforms like iHappy and CamSoda, gaming apps such as 8 Ball Pool and Block Blast, and utility applications including Chrome and file managers.
The malicious infrastructure demonstrates consistent patterns across multiple indicators:
- IP Addresses: Concentrated around 154.90.58.26 and 199.247.6.61.
- Hosting Providers: Lightnode Limited and Vultr Holdings LLC.
- Domain Registrars: NameSilo LLC and XinNet Technology Corporation.
- SSL Certificates: R10 and R11 issuers for legitimacy appearance.
- Nameservers: dnsowl.com and xincache.com.
- Web Server: nginx architecture.
When users click the “Install” button on these fake pages, JavaScript functions automatically trigger the download of malicious APK files directly from the fraudulent websites.

Advanced Evasion Techniques
The latest SpyNote samples employ a sophisticated multi-stage infection process designed to evade security detection.


The initial dropper APK contains encrypted assets that require a 16-byte AES decryption key derived from the application’s manifest package name.
In analyzed samples, the package name “rogcysibz.wbnyvkrn.sstjjs” generates the key “62646632363164386461323836333631” needed for payload extraction.

The malware utilizes DEX Element Injection, a code injection technique that modifies Android’s ClassLoader at runtime.
This forces the operating system to prioritize malicious code over legitimate application functions, enabling SpyNote to hijack app behavior and intercept sensitive data.
The dropper combines encrypted files from the assets/base folder, decrypts them using AES encryption, and decompresses the result to reveal the full SpyNote payload.
Recent versions implement control flow obfuscation and identifier obfuscation using random variations of “o,” “O,” and “0” characters throughout the code.
This technique significantly complicates static analysis efforts by security researchers and automated detection systems.
Extensive Surveillance Threatens Privacy
According to the report, SpyNote functions as a comprehensive Remote Access Trojan with alarming surveillance capabilities.
The malware can remotely control device cameras and microphones, manage phone calls, and execute arbitrary commands.
Its keylogging functionality specifically targets application credentials while abusing Android’s Accessibility Services to steal two-factor authentication codes.
The malware performs overlay attacks for clickjacking and can display deceptive interfaces to capture additional user credentials.
When granted administrator privileges, SpyNote gains the ability to remotely wipe device data, lock screens, or install additional malicious applications.
Security experts recommend that browser developers strengthen malicious site detection, Android security providers enhance automated app analysis, and mobile VPN providers integrate network-level filtering to combat these evolving threats.
The persistent nature of this campaign highlights the ongoing risk mobile RATs pose to consumer privacy and financial security.
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
Malware Delivery
IP/Domain | Malicious File |
---|---|
154.90.58[.]26 | – |
mcspa[.]top | – |
pyfcf[.]top | 001.apk |
atdfp[.]top | Holding Hands.apk |
fkqed[.]top | 001.apk |
mygta[.]top | Block Blast.apk |
fsckk[.]top | yome.apk |
megha[.]top | iHappy.apk |
pyane[.]top | Compras Online.apk |
bekmc[.]top | TmmTmm.apk |
kasmc[.]top | FaíscaInicial.apk |
fhkaw[.]top | Kismia.apk |
hytsa[.]top | Chrome.apk |
cfdta[.]top | FaíscaInicial.apk |
fcewa[.]top | Chrome.apk |
hekbb[.]top | GlamLive.apk |
spwtt[.]top | LoveVideo.apk |
atubh[.]top | Chrome.apk |
kshyq[.]top | 004.apk |
ctdqa[.]top | 003.apk |
kyhbc[.]top | 002.apk |
gtuaw[.]top | Chrome.apk |
snbyp[.]top | meus arquivos 2025.apk |
jewrs[.]top | CamSoda.apk |
pkdcp[.]top | FaíscaInicial.apk |
byhga[.]top | 8 Ball Pool.apk |
bcgrt[.]top | Beauty.apk |
kmyjh[.]top | 001.apk |
Command & Control:
IP/Domain |
---|
199.247.6[.]61 |
mskisdakw[.]top |
fsdlaowaa[.]top |
askkpl67[.]top |
cnhau1wq[.]top |
nhy58awn[.]top |
sakjhu5588[.]top |
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