Chinese Hackers Using ToolShell Vulnerability To Compromise Networks Of Government Agencies


China-based threat actors have exploited the critical ToolShell vulnerability in Microsoft SharePoint servers to infiltrate networks across multiple continents, targeting government agencies and critical infrastructure in a suspected espionage campaign.

This vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-53770, enables unauthenticated remote code execution and has been actively used since its disclosure in July 2025, despite Microsoft’s rapid patching efforts.

Security researchers from Symantec report that the attacks began shortly after patches were released, affecting organizations in the Middle East, Africa, South America, and beyond.

ToolShell stems from a deserialization of untrusted data issue in on-premises SharePoint servers, allowing attackers to execute arbitrary code without authentication.

It builds on earlier flaws like CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706, which were demonstrated at the Pwn2Own Berlin event in May 2025.

The exploit chain typically involves an authentication bypass (CVE-2025-53771), where a crafted POST request to the ToolPane.aspx endpoint tricks the server into granting access, followed by injecting malicious payloads for code execution.

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Microsoft confirmed exploitation by at least three Chinese-linked groups Budworm (Linen Typhoon), Sheathminer (Violet Typhoon), and Storm-2603 shortly after patching on July 21, 2025.

These actors have leveraged ToolShell for zero-day attacks, compromising file systems and enabling persistent access.

Targets And Attack Patterns

The campaign’s scope is broad, with confirmed breaches in a Middle Eastern telecom firm, two African government departments, South American agencies, a U.S. university, an African state technology entity, a Middle Eastern government department, and a European finance company.

Initial access in the Middle East occurred on July 21, 2025, via a webshell deployment, followed by DLL sideloading of malware using legitimate binaries from Trend Micro and BitDefender.

In South American cases, attackers exploited SQL and Apache HTTP servers with Adobe ColdFusion, using a renamed “mantec.exe” to mimic Symantec tools and sideload malicious DLLs.

Evidence points to mass scanning for vulnerable servers, with selective follow-up on high-value targets for credential theft and lateral movement.

The attackers deployed Zingdoor, a Go-based HTTP backdoor linked to the Glowworm group (aka Earth Estries or FamousSparrow), first documented in 2023 for espionage against government and tech sectors.

ShadowPad, a modular RAT associated with APT41-nexus groups like Blackfly, was also used via DLL sideloading for command execution and updates.

KrustyLoader, a Rust-written loader tied to UNC5221 (a China-nexus actor), delivered second-stage payloads like Sliver, an open-source C2 framework abused for red-team emulation.

Living-off-the-land tools included Certutil for downloads, Procdump and LsassDumper for credential dumping, GoGo Scanner for reconnaissance, Revsocks for proxying, and the PetitPotam exploit (CVE-2021-36942) for privilege escalation.

IoCs

This activity highlights ToolShell’s widespread abuse beyond initial reports, underscoring the need for urgent patching of on-premises SharePoint instances.

With over 400 compromises detected and links to Salt Typhoon tactics, the operations suggest state-sponsored espionage focused on persistent, stealthy network access.

TypeIndicatorDescription
SHA256 Hash6240e39475f04bfe55ab7cba8746bd08901d7678b1c7742334d56f2bc8620a35LsassDumper
SHA256 Hash929e3fdd3068057632b52ecdfd575ab389390c852b2f4e65dc32f20c87521600KrustyLoader
SHA256 Hashdb15923c814a4b00ddb79f9c72f8546a44302ac2c66c7cc89a144cb2c2bb40faLikely ShadowPad
SHA256 Hashe6c216cec379f418179a3f6a79df54dcf6e6e269a3ce3479fd7e6d4a15ac066eShadowPad Loader
SHA256 Hash071e662fc5bc0e54bcfd49493467062570d0307dc46f0fb51a68239d281427c6Zingdoor
SHA256 Hash1f94ea00be79b1e4e8e0b7bbf2212f2373da1e13f92b4ca2e9e0ffc5f93e452bPetitPotam/CVE-2021-36942 exploit
SHA256 Hashdbdc1beeb5c72d7b505a9a6c31263fc900ea3330a59f08e574fd172f3596c1b8RevSocks
SHA256 Hash6aecf805f72c9f35dadda98177f11ca6a36e8e7e4348d72eaf1a80a899aa6566LsassDumper
SHA256 Hash568561d224ef29e5051233ab12d568242e95d911b08ce7f2c9bf2604255611a9Socks Proxy
SHA256 Hash28a859046a43fc8a7a7453075130dd649eb2d1dd0ebf0abae5d575438a25ece9GoGo Scanner
SHA256 Hash7be8e37bc61005599e4e6817eb2a3a4a5519fded76cb8bf11d7296787c754d40Sliver
SHA256 Hash5b165b01f9a1395cae79e0f85b7a1c10dc089340cf4e7be48813ac2f8686ed61ProcDump
SHA256 Hashe4ea34a7c2b51982a6c42c6367119f34bec9aeb9a60937836540035583a5b3bcProcDump
SHA256 Hash7803ae7ba5d4e7d38e73745b3f321c2ca714f3141699d984322fa92e0ff037a1Minidump
SHA256 Hash7acf21677322ef2aa835b5836d3e4b8a6b78ae10aa29d6640885e933f83a4b01mantec.exe (Benign executable)
SHA256 Hash6c48a510642a1ba516dbc5effe3671524566b146e04d99ab7f4832f66b3f95aabugsplatrc.dll
URLhttp://kia-almotores.s3.amazonaws[.]com/sy1cyjtKrustyLoader C&C server
URLhttp://omnileadzdev.s3.amazonaws[.]com/PBfbN58lXKrustyLoader C&C server

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