eScan Antivirus Update Server Hacked to Push Malicious Update packages

eScan Antivirus Update Server Hacked to Push Malicious Update packages

A critical supply chain compromise affecting MicroWorld Technologies’ eScan antivirus product, wherein threat actors successfully hijacked the vendor’s legitimate update infrastructure to distribute malware.

Discovered on January 20, 2026, by Morphisec, the attack utilized a trojanized update package to deploy multi-stage malware across enterprise and consumer endpoints globally.

The incident renders the antivirus software ineffective and specifically tampers with system configurations to prevent automatic remediation.

Trojanized Update Mechanism and Attack Chain

The compromise was initiated through a malicious update pushed directly via eScan’s official channels. The attack chain begins with “Stage 1,” where a trojanized component replaces the legitimate Reload.exe (32-bit) binary.

Morphisec observed that the malicious executable is digitally signed with a valid certificate belonging to “eScan (Microworld Technologies Inc.),” allowing it to bypass standard trust verifications.

Once executed, this payload drops a “Stage 3” downloader identified as CONSCTLX.exe. Following the initial breach, a “Stage 2” downloader establishes persistence and executes defense evasion maneuvers.

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This stage is particularly aggressive, employing PowerShell execution and tampering with the Windows Registry to disable security features.

The malware connects to Command and Control (C2) infrastructure to retrieve additional payloads, effectively turning the security tool into a gateway for further compromise.

A defining characteristic of this campaign is its focus on “anti-remediation.” The malware actively modifies the infected system’s hosts file to block communication with eScan’s update servers.

Furthermore, it alters specific eScan registry keys and configuration files to break the antivirus’s update mechanism permanently.

Consequently, infected systems cannot receive automatic patches or definitions, leaving them vulnerable even after the vendor restores their infrastructure.

Persistence is achieved through the creation of deceptive Scheduled Tasks located in C:WindowsDefrag. The malware generates tasks using a naming pattern that mimics legitimate system processes, such as WindowsDefragCorelDefrag.

Additionally, registry persistence is established under HKLMSoftware using randomly generated GUID keys containing encoded PowerShell payloads.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Organizations utilizing eScan antivirus are urged to scan their environments immediately for the following indicators.

Note that automatic remediation is not possible; the presence of these files indicates a compromise requiring manual intervention.

Component Description Filename SHA-256 Hash
Stage 1 Payload (Trojanized Update) Reload[.]exe (32-bit) 36ef2ec9ada035c56644f677dab65946798575e1d8b14f1365f22d7c68269860
Stage 3 Downloader CONSCTLX[.]exe (64-bit) bec369597633eac7cc27a698288e4ae8d12bdd9b01946e73a28e1423b17252b1
Related Sample N/A 674943387cc7e0fd18d0d6278e6e4f7a0f3059ee6ef94e0976fae6954ffd40dd
Related Sample N/A 386a16926aff225abc31f73e8e040ac0c53fb093e7daf3fbd6903c157d88958c

Network Indicators and C2 Infrastructure

Network administrators should block egress traffic to the following domains, which have been identified as part of the attacker’s command and control infrastructure.

Domain / IP Context
hxxps[://]vhs[.]delrosal[.]net/i C2 Infrastructure
hxxps[://]tumama[.]hns[.]to C2 Infrastructure
hxxps[://]blackice[.]sol-domain[.]org C2 Infrastructure
504e1a42.host.njalla.net Malicious Host
185.241.208[.]115 Malicious IP

Because the malware effectively breaks the update mechanism of the antivirus software, automatic updates will fail on compromised machines.

eScan has reportedly taken the global update system offline for over eight hours to isolate the infrastructure, but this does not clean already infected endpoints.

Administrators must assume compromise for systems running eScan that were active on or after January 20, 2026.

Immediate steps include verifying the hosts file for entries blocking eScan domains and inspecting the registry for suspicious GUID keys containing byte array data.

Affected organizations must contact MicroWorld Technologies (eScan) directly to obtain a specialized manual patch designed to revert the configuration changes and restore the updater’s functionality.

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