Security researchers have uncovered a sophisticated multi-stage malware campaign targeting Maven Central, the primary repository for Java dependencies.
The attack centered on a malicious package impersonating the legitimate Jackson JSON library marking the first significant detection of advanced malware in an ecosystem that has historically remained resilient against supply chain attacks.
The malicious package, published under the namespace org.fasterxml.jackson.core, exploits a critical blind spot in Maven Central’s namespace protection.
The legitimate Jackson library operates under com.fasterxml.jackson.core, making the attack a textbook prefix-swap typosquatting scheme.
This mirrors a corresponding domain typosquat: fasterxml.org versus the legitimate fasterxml.com. The subtle distinction a .com to .org swap is precisely engineered to escape casual inspection while remaining entirely attacker-controlled.
The malicious package was successfully deployed on Maven Central and remained active until the security team reported it to the platform.
Maven Central removed the package within 1.5 hours of notification, though the brevity of exposure time underscores the urgency of supply chain defense.
Technical Sophistication
Analysis of the deobfuscated code reveals a Trojan downloader with multi-stage payload delivery.
Security researchers recommend Maven Central implement prefix-similarity detection for high-value namespaces and maintain protected lists requiring additional verification before publication.
The malware operates as a Spring Boot auto-configuration class, leveraging @Configuration annotations to execute automatically when an infected application starts requiring no explicit developer invocation.
The attack unfolds across seven distinct stages. Upon execution, the malware first checks for a persistence marker file (.idea.pid, deliberately named to blend with IntelliJ IDEA artifacts).
It then fingerprints the target operating system and establishes contact with a command-and-control (C2) server at http://m.fasterxml[.]org:51211/config.txt.
The C2 server responds with AES-encrypted configuration strings, each containing a platform-specific payload URL.
The malware decrypts these using a hardcoded 16-character key and downloads operating system-specific binaries svchosts.exe for Windows (itself a typosquat of legitimate svchost.exe), and unsigned executables for macOS and Linux.
Finally, the malware suppresses all output and achieves persistence by creating the marker file to prevent re-execution.
The original code employed multilayered obfuscation designed to frustrate both traditional and AI-based analysis.
Techniques included encrypted configuration strings, reversed encryption keys, Base64 encoding chains, and deliberate prompt-injection strings targeting LLM-based malware analyzers. Unicode rendering tricks further obscured the code when viewed in standard editors.
Cobalt Strike Attribution
Security researchers retrieved and submitted both binaries to VirusTotal for analysis. The Linux and macOS payloads were consistently identified as Cobalt Strike beacons a commercial penetration testing framework that provides full remote access, credential harvesting, and lateral movement capabilities.
While legitimate for authorized red team operations, leaked versions have become the toolkit of choice for ransomware operators and advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.
This attack exposes a critical vulnerability in Maven Central’s namespace governance. Java’s reverse-domain naming convention has provided strong protection against obvious typosquatting, but the prefix-swap technique demonstrates this defense is insufficient.
With npm and PyPI already hardening defenses against supply chain attacks, Java ecosystems remain comparatively vulnerable.
The simplicity of this attack coupled with its unprecedented success in a previously resilient ecosystem suggests widespread imitation is inevitable unless defenses are implemented immediately.
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