Kimsuky APT Uses LNK Files to Deploy Reflective Malware and Evade Windows Defender

Kimsuky APT Uses LNK Files to Deploy Reflective Malware and Evade Windows Defender

The North Korean state-sponsored group Kimsuky, also known as APT43, Thallium, and Velvet Chollima, has been accused of launching a recent cyber-espionage campaign in which the attackers used malicious Windows shortcut (LNK) files as the first point of entry to breach South Korean government agencies, defense contractors, and research institutions.

The operation begins with phishing emails containing ZIP archives that embed these LNK files, disguised as legitimate documents.

Upon execution, the LNK file invokes mshta.exe to load a remote HTML Application (HTA) file from a Content Delivery Network (CDN), which contains heavily obfuscated VBScript.

This script employs decimal and hexadecimal conversions via CLng and Chr functions to construct strings for URLs and commands, effectively bypassing static analysis and endpoint detection.

Sophisticated Infection Chain

According to the report, the malware then downloads a decoy PDF lure, such as repurposed South Korean government notices about sex offenders or tax penalties, to distract the victim while proceeding with payload deployment.

Lure PDF

Simultaneously, it queries the status of Windows Defender using cmd /c sc query WinDefend. If Defender is active, the script downloads and decodes a ZIP archive containing Base64-encoded PowerShell scripts for information stealing and keylogging.

These scripts ensure one-time execution by storing the process ID in a UUID-based temporary file, perform anti-VM checks against manufacturers like VMware, Microsoft, and VirtualBox, and establish persistence via a registry run key under HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun named WindowsSecurityCheck.

Data Exfiltration Tactics

When Windows Defender is disabled, the malware escalates by downloading an alternative HTA file that embeds Base64-encoded payloads, extracting and executing a reflective DLL loader without disk writes.

Kimsuky APT
Overview of the Infection Chain

This loader decrypts encrypted files using RC4, injects them into memory via VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread, targeting the ReflectiveLoader export to evade file-based detection.

The injected payload steals app_bound_encrypted_key from Chromium-based browsers like Chrome, Edge, and Brave, facilitating offline decryption of credentials and cookies.

Throughout the campaign, the malware conducts victim profiling by compressing certificate directories (NPKI, GPKI), harvesting recent files from shortcut paths, extracting browser data including logins and extensions, and scanning drives for sensitive extensions like .docx, .pdf, and cryptocurrency-related terms.

Data is staged in a UUID-named folder under %TEMP%, compressed into init.zip (renamed to init.dat), and exfiltrated in 1MB chunks via HTTP POST to command-and-control (C2) servers such as ygbsbl.hopto.org, disguised as normal web traffic.

Keylogging captures keystrokes, clipboard changes, and window titles using GetAsyncKeyState and GetForegroundWindow APIs, logging to k.log for periodic upload.

The C2 loop, executed every 10 minutes, queries /rd for file uploads, /wr for downloads, and /cm for remote PowerShell commands via Invoke-Expression, enabling dynamic payload delivery and real-time control.

Attribution to Kimsuky is reinforced by consistent TTPs, including PowerShell abuse and South Korean-specific lures, aligning with prior reports from Seqrite and security researchers in early 2025.

This campaign underscores Kimsuky’s evolution in blending social engineering with modular malware, exploiting legitimate tools for stealth and persistence.

By mapping to MITRE ATT&CK techniques like T1204.002 (Malicious File Execution), T1059.005 (VBScript), T1218.005 (mshta), and T1620 (Reflective Code Loading), it highlights risks to politically sensitive sectors.

Organizations should implement behavioral monitoring, PowerShell auditing, and unified SASE platforms for anomaly detection to disrupt such threats.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

SHA256 Description
87e8287509a79099170b5b6941209b5787140a8f6182d460618d4ed93418aff9 Malicious LNK
232e618eda0ab1b85157ddbc67a4d0071c408c6f82045da2056550bfbca4140f Malicious LNK
0df3afc6f4bbf69e569607f52926b8da4ce1ebc2a4747e7a17dbc0a13e050707 Zip.log
7b06e14a39ff68f75ad80fd5f43a8a3328053923d101a34b7fb0d55235ab170b sxzjl.hta
b98626ebd717ace83cd7c312f081ce260e00f299b8d427bfb9ec465fa4bdf28b V3.hta
3db2e176f53bf2b8b1c0d26b8a880ff059c0b4d1eda1cc4e9865bbe5a04ad37a Sys.dll
ce4dbe59ca56039ddc7316fee9e883b3d3a1ef17809e7f4eec7c3824ae2ebf96 App64.log
a499b66ea8eb5f32d685980eddacaaf0abc1f9eac7e634229e972c2bf3b03d68 Mani64.log
ce4dbe59ca56039ddc7316fee9e883b3d3a1ef17809e7f4eec7c3824ae2ebf96 Net64.log
ygbsbl.hopto.org C&C server
hvmeyq.viewdns.net C&C server

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