A medium-severity vulnerability has been discovered in the official Kubernetes C# client, which could allow an attacker to intercept and manipulate sensitive communications.
The flaw, rated 6.8 on the CVSS scale, stems from improper certificate validation logic.
This weakness exposes applications using the client to Man-in-the-Middle (MiTM) attacks, potentially leading to the compromise of credentials, tokens, and other confidential data transmitted to the Kubernetes API server.
Flawed Certificate Validation
The core of the vulnerability lies in how the Kubernetes C# client handles TLS/HTTPS connections that use custom Certificate Authorities (CAs) specified in a kubeconfig file.
The client’s validation process correctly checks if a presented certificate is well-formed, but fails to verify the trust chain against the specified CA properly.
This means it will accept a certificate signed by any valid authority, rather than exclusively trusting the custom CA defined by the user.
An attacker positioned on the same network as the client can exploit this by presenting a forged but validly signed certificate.
This allows them to impersonate the Kubernetes API server, establishing a MiTM position where they can decrypt, read, and alter all traffic between the client and the server.
This vulnerability affects all versions of the Kubernetes C# client up to and including 17.0.13. Environments are considered vulnerable if they utilize the C# client to connect to a Kubernetes API server over an untrusted network while specifying a custom CA via the certificate-authority field in the kubeconfig file.
The primary and most effective mitigation is to upgrade to the patched version, 17.0.14 or newer, which correctly enforces trust chain validation.
For organizations unable to patch immediately, a workaround involves moving the custom CA certificate from the kubeconfig file into the system’s main trust store, reads the advisory.
However, this action carries its own risks, as it causes all processes on the machine to begin trusting certificates signed by that CA.
Mitigations
To determine if their applications are affected, administrators should first identify all instances of the Kubernetes C# client in their environment.
A thorough review of kubeconfig files is necessary to check for the use of the certificate-authority field within cluster configurations.
System administrators should also inspect client-side application logs for any unexpected certificate warnings or connection errors, which could indicate an attempted or successful exploit.
Given the potential for data interception and API command manipulation, security teams are strongly advised to prioritize the deployment of the fixed client version.
Proactive auditing and prompt patching are crucial to securing Kubernetes environments against this impersonation threat.
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