Lenovo Vantage Flaws Enable Attackers to Gain SYSTEM-Level Privileges

Security researchers at Atredis have uncovered multiple privilege escalation vulnerabilities in Lenovo Vantage, a pre-installed management platform on Lenovo laptops that handles device updates, configurations, and system health monitoring.

These flaws, tracked under CVEs 2025-6230, 2025-6231, and 2025-6232, allow unprivileged users to bypass authentication mechanisms and execute code with SYSTEM-level privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise.

Lenovo released patches on July 8, 2025, as part of advisory LEN-196648, addressing all identified issues.

Lenovo Vantage Flaw

The vulnerabilities stem from Lenovo Vantage’s modular architecture, which features a central SYSTEM-privileged service communicating via RPC endpoints with pluggable add-ins written in C#.

This design exposes JSON-based requests routed to add-ins defined in XML files under %ProgramData%LenovoVantageAddins, where execution contexts vary, with five add-ins running elevated.

Authentication relies on digital signature verification of client processes, a common but bypassable control seen in vendors like Dell and Asus.

Attackers can exploit this by hijacking a signed Lenovo binary, such as FnhotkeyWidget.exe, through DLL search order hijacking in a writable directory, injecting code like a profapi.dll payload to access RPC interfaces.

Delving into the specifics, CVE-2025-6230 involves SQL injection flaws in the VantageCoreAddin, which manages core system functions and stores settings in a SYSTEM-protected SQLite database at C:ProgramDataLenovoVantageSettingsLocalSettings.db.

Commands like DeleteTable and DeleteSetting fail to sanitize the “Component” field, enabling arbitrary SQL execution via stacked queries supported by the .NET SQLite library.

Exploitation Techniques

While direct code execution is limited due to disabled user-defined functions, attackers can create files with controlled content, facilitating further escalation.

CVE-2025-6232 exploits a flawed registry whitelist in the Set-KeyChildren command, intended to restrict writes to HKCUSOFTWARELenovo but vulnerable to substring matching via IndexOf checks.

By crafting paths like HKLMSOFTWARELenovoHKCUSOFTWARELenovo and leveraging writable Lenovo-specific HKLM keys (e.g., under SOFTWAREWOW6432NodeLenovoPWRMGRVConfKeysData), adversaries can modify DACLs for inheritance, create symbolic links using RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx, and redirect writes to privileged areas.

This enables tampering with service image paths, allowing arbitrary binaries to run elevated upon service start.

CVE-2025-6231 combines path traversal and time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) in the LenovoSystemUpdateAddin during the Do-DownloadAndInstallAppComponent command’s InstallOny action.

According to the Report, Unsanitized AppID fields permit directory traversal to load manifests from attacker-controlled paths, while non-atomic validation in GetAppInformation using XMLFileValidator for signature checks followed by File.ReadAllText allows symlink swaps via tools like BaitAndSwitch.

This loads untrusted manifests, enabling control over installer parameters for admin or SYSTEM contexts, such as injecting arguments into PowerShell-launched processes or leveraging installers like MSI and Inno Setup for elevated execution without UAC bypass necessities in some flows.

To mitigate, users should verify updates: VantageCoreAddin to version 1.0.0.199 or later, LenovoSystemUpdateAddin to 1.0.24.32 or higher, Lenovo Vantage to 10.2501.20.0, and Lenovo Commercial Vantage to 20.2506.39.0.

These can be checked in add-in XML files or install paths. The findings highlight risks in vendor software relying on signature-based auth and underscore the need for atomic operations, input sanitization, and stricter path validations in privileged services.

Stay Updated on Daily Cybersecurity News. Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X.