Mustang Panda Uses SnakeDisk USB Worm and Toneshell Backdoor to Target Air-Gap Systems

Mustang Panda Uses SnakeDisk USB Worm and Toneshell Backdoor to Target Air-Gap Systems

IBM X-Force researchers have uncovered sophisticated new malware campaigns orchestrated by the China-aligned threat actor Hive0154, also known as Mustang Panda.

The discovery includes an advanced Toneshell backdoor variant that evades detection systems and a novel USB worm called SnakeDisk specifically targeting Thailand-based devices.

PDF containing download link for weaponized archive deploying Toneshell7

Enhanced Toneshell Backdoor Evades Detection

The latest iteration of Toneshell, dubbed Toneshell9, represents a significant advancement in the threat actor’s capabilities.

This updated variant introduces proxy communication features that allow the malware to blend seamlessly with legitimate enterprise network traffic by utilizing locally configured proxy servers.

Key Technical Features:

  • Dual reverse shell functionality enabling simultaneous command execution streams.
  • Proxy-aware communication to bypass enterprise egress filtering.
  • Enhanced evasion techniques including junk code injection with ChatGPT-sourced strings.
  • Custom encryption methods using modified pseudo-random number generators.

Toneshell9 establishes persistence through DLL sideloading techniques and maintains command-and-control communication by disguising traffic as TLS 1.2 Application Data packets.

The malware creates a sophisticated client object capable of managing multiple C2 servers, proxy configurations, and encryption keys simultaneously.

Its ability to enumerate Windows registry hives for proxy settings demonstrates the group’s deep understanding of enterprise network architectures.

SnakeDisk Worm Hits Thailand

The newly identified SnakeDisk USB worm showcases Hive0154’s targeted approach to cyber espionage operations.

This malware specifically checks for Thailand-based IP addresses before executing, suggesting a strategic focus on Thai government and organizational networks during heightened regional tensions.

Operational Characteristics:

  • Geolocation-based execution limited to Thailand IP addresses.
  • USB propagation mechanism infecting removable storage devices.
  • Yokai backdoor deployment establishing persistent remote access.
  • File hiding capabilities masking legitimate USB contents to avoid detection.

The timing of SnakeDisk’s deployment coincides with escalating Thailand-Cambodia border disputes and diplomatic tensions throughout 2025.

The worm’s sophisticated USB infection mechanism suggests attempts to penetrate air-gapped systems commonly employed in sensitive government environments.

When triggered, SnakeDisk drops the Yokai backdoor, previously linked to campaigns against Thai officials in December 2024.

Expanding Chinese Cyber Operations

Security researchers attribute this activity to Hive0154, a well-established China-aligned threat group that operates multiple subclusters targeting government agencies, think tanks, and private organizations across East Asia.

The group’s arsenal includes numerous custom malware loaders, backdoors, and USB worm families, demonstrating advanced development capabilities.

The discovery of weaponized archives uploaded from Singapore and Thailand throughout mid-2025 indicates sustained targeting of Southeast Asian entities.

These campaigns have utilized social engineering lures impersonating government communications, including fake Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents distributed through cloud storage platforms like Box and Google Drive.

IBM X-Force assesses that China’s strategic interests in the region, particularly regarding Cambodia as a key ally, may have provided motivation for intensified operations against Thailand.

The deployment of geographically-restricted malware suggests a calculated approach to intelligence collection during a period of regional instability.

Organizations in the targeted regions should implement enhanced security measures including monitoring for suspicious USB devices, detecting TLS traffic without proper handshakes, and scrutinizing cloud storage download links in official communications.

The sophisticated nature of these tools indicates Hive0154’s continued evolution as a significant cyber threat to regional stability and organizational security.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):

Indicator Indicator Type Context
f8b28cae687bd55a148d363d58f13a797486f12221f0e0d080ffb53611d54231 SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell8
8132beeb25ce7baed0b561922d264b2a9852957df7b6a3daacfbb3a969485c79 SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell8
d1466dca25e28f0b7fae71d5c2abc07b397037a9e674f38602690e96cc5b2bd4 SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell8
1272a0853651069ed4dc505007e8525f99e1454f9e033bcc2e58d60fdafa4f02 SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell8
b8c31b8d8af9e6eae15f30019e39c52b1a53aa1c8b0c93c8d075254ed10d8dfc SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell7
7087e84f69c47910fd39c3869a706e55324783af8d03465a9e7bfde52fe4d1d6 SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Pubload
38fcd10100f1bfd75f8dc0883b0c2cb48321ef1c57906798a422f2a2de17d50c SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Pubload
69cb87b2d8ee50f46dae791b5a0c5735a7554cc3c21bb1d989baa0f38c45085c SHA256 PDF containing download URL for weaponized archive
564a03763879aaed4da8a8c1d6067f4112d8e13bb46c2f80e0fcb9ffdd40384c SHA256 Loader injecting Toneshell7
e4bb60d899699fd84126f9fa0dff72314610c56fffca3d11f3b6fc93fcb75e00 SHA256 Loader injecting Pubload
c2d1ff85e9bb8feb14fd015dceee166c2e52e2226c07e23acc348815c0eb4608 SHA256 Loader injecting Pubload
188.208.141[.]196 IPv4 Pubload C2 server
bdbc936ddc9234385317c4ee83bda087e389235c4a182736fc597565042f7644 SHA256 Toneshell8 backdoor
f0fec3b271b83e23ed7965198f3b00eece45bd836bf10c038e9910675bafefb1 SHA256 Toneshell8 backdoor
e7b29611c789a6225aebbc9fee3710a57b51537693cb2ec16e2177c22392b546 SHA256 Toneshell8 backdoor
9ca5b2cbc3677a5967c448d9d21eb56956898ccd08c06b372c6471fb68d37d7d SHA256 Toneshell8 backdoor
146.70.29[.]229 IPv4 Toneshell7/Toneshell8 C2 server
318a1ebc0692d1d012d20d306d6634b196cc387b1f4bc38f97dd437f117c7e20 SHA256 Toneshell9 backdoor
0d632a8f6dd69566ad98db56e53c8f16286a59ea2bea81c2761d43b6ab4ecafd SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell9
39e7bbcceddd16f6c4f2fc2335a50c534e182669cb5fa90cbe29e49ec6dfd0df SHA256 Weaponized archive delivering Toneshell9
05eb6a06b404b6340960d7a6cf6b1293e706ce00d7cba9a8b72b3780298dc25d SHA256 Loader containing Toneshell fork (basis for Toneshell9)
123.253.34[.]44 IPv4 Toneshell9 C2 server
www.slickvpn[.]com Domain Toneshell9 C2 server
dd694aaf44731da313e4594d6ca34a6b8e0fcce505e39f8273b9242fdf6220e0 SHA256 SnakeDisk USB worm
bb5bb82e5caf7d4dbbe878b75b23f793a5f3c5ca6dba70d8be447e8c004d26ce SHA256 SnakeDisk’s benign EXE payload used for DLL sideloading Yokai
35bec1d8699d29c27b66e5646e58d25ce85ea1e41481d048bcea89ea94f8fb4b SHA256 Yokai backdoor DLL
http://118.174.183[.]89/kptinfo/import/index.php URL Yokai C2 server

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About Cybernoz

Security researcher and threat analyst with expertise in malware analysis and incident response.