Problems experienced by users of the Post Office’s Horizon system are well known today, but the system’s predecessor, Capture, also caused huge problems for users which caused life changing suffering.
The Post Office knew in February 1992, before the Capture software was launched, that its data could be corrupted simply by switching the machine off, for example in a power cut. Yet they ploughed on without addressing the problem. There was also no audit trail in Capture so nobody could tell who had done what.
The 1990s saw the introduction of the infallible computer illusion, the first decade where computers were in widespread use. Capture was seen as a good thing as errors were reduced, but crucially they were not eliminated.
The Post Office provided statistics in newsletters—June 1994—”Capture offices make 55% fewer Cash Account errors than non automated offices,” it wrote. They trumpeted: “CAPTURE will cut down errors and SAVE YOU TIME, AGGRAVATION AND MONEY.”
What about the errors that remained? The Post Office continued to be aware of the disastrous effects of power failures. Quirks and pitfalls in the software were also highlighted: “Any information input in Cash & Stock on Hand prior to the upgrade will be overwritten and will need to be reinputted.”
All of this assumed that busy subpostmasters had got the memo. They were working long hours with many tasks, including their non-PO business, some marking-up newspapers early in the morning. None of this troubled local Post Office managers, auditors, investigators, Post Office top brass, solicitors, judges and juries. Prosecutions continued.
The implausibility of Subpostmasters stealing from their own businesses did not impinge. In fact the reverse was happening—with Subpostmasters putting their own money in the till to keep the show on the road.
Bravery awards, Post Office of the Year awards, did not save the victims. As I write some one hundred Capture cases are being investigated. All these years later exoneration and redress remain in the future. The end is not in sight and the suffering goes on.
Military culture
When I joined the Post Office in 1974 the road to preferment was via the Freemasons and the Territorial Army, (there was a Post Office TA unit at Mill Hill, London) — membership of both by invitation.
The Post Office fostered a military culture. They liked uniforms and ex-soldiers for postmen. It was a peculiar place to work.
The Official Secrets Act stifled debate and made for an insular culture. If you saw something bad you kept quiet.
One Director was known to fake back-dated memos when in a jam. Nothing was done.
They successfully covered up the loss of hundreds of millions of pounds on abortive computer projects such as the Thames Valley Pilot.
The write-offs showed up in the Post Office Report & Accounts, but went largely unremarked.
I recall my time at the Post Office particularly in the 1980s and 1990s as being characterised by fear, loathing and paranoia. As a manager one of my tasks in Birmingham (1983-1986) was credit control.
There had been an incident at Northampton where a customer had gone bust owing the Post Office some £250,000.
I feared for my job, chasing debts. I had a habit of visiting local post offices. I recall one unannounced visit where the lady branch manager was trembling. She rushed out of the office to meet me. Plainly she had not seen anyone from Birmingham Head Office in years.
A visit from the boss could only mean one thing. She was convinced it must be the sack. When I said it was a social call she was astounded.
As the 1990s rolled on the Post Office was busy shutting directly-managed Branch Offices and outsourcing the business to sub-offices, franchises etc. So an increasing proportion of the turnover was passing out of direct control. The knowledge within the business of how to run an office was being diluted and few managers in London had operational experience in the field.
Huge sums of money were being handled by agents, who were lightly supervised at best. A hands-off approach. Sub-offices only received occasional visits, mainly from local managers and auditors, mostly when there was trouble (This was tightened up over time. Retail Network Managers were introduced but with much territory to cover.)
There was a triangle of the Sub-office, the local Remittance Unit and the Finance Department in Chesterfield at the top. The local managers were semi-detached. They were responsible but not really in control. They had rudimentary computer knowledge, if at all.