Qilin Ransomware Affiliate Panel Login Credentials Exposed Online

A significant security breach within the Qilin ransomware operation has provided unprecedented insight into the group’s affiliate network structure and operational methods.

On July 31, 2025, internal conflicts between the ransomware group and one of its affiliates led to the public exposure of sensitive operational details, marking a rare glimpse into the inner workings of a major ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation.

Affiliate Dispute Leads to Major Intelligence Leak

The exposure began when a Qilin affiliate operating under the handle “hastalamuerte” publicly accused the ransomware group of conducting an exit scam, allegedly defrauding the affiliate of $48,000.

This dispute escalated when another cybercriminal known as “Nova,” associated with a competing ransomware group, released login credentials and access details to Qilin’s affiliate management panel on dark web forums.

The leaked information included administrative access to the group’s internal systems, which Qilin has been using to coordinate attacks against over 600 victims since 2022.

Among the high-profile targets compromised by Qilin operations are the Palau Health Ministry, Japan’s Utsunomiya Cancer Center, and Lee Enterprises in the United States.

The RaaS model employed by Qilin allows multiple affiliates to conduct attacks using the group’s infrastructure and tools, significantly increasing their operational scale and impact.

The leak represents more than just a business dispute; it demonstrates the volatile nature of cybercriminal partnerships and how internal conflicts can lead to significant operational security failures.

Nova’s involvement in exposing Qilin’s infrastructure appears to be strategically motivated, as competing ransomware groups often attempt to undermine each other’s operations to gain market advantage.

Technical Arsenal and Operational Methods Revealed

Analysis of the exposed affiliate’s activities revealed sophisticated technical capabilities and tool usage patterns.

Cybersecurity researchers discovered that the affiliate “hastalamuerte” maintained a GitHub repository containing various penetration testing and credential harvesting tools, including a version of Mimikatz packed with Themida encryption to evade detection.

The affiliate’s toolkit included NetExec, a powerful network penetration testing framework particularly effective against Active Directory environments, and showed specific interest in cryptocurrency-related tools, including APIs for Bitkub, Thailand’s leading Bitcoin exchange.

This suggests potential geographic targeting or money laundering capabilities within the operation.

Key Tools and Capabilities Discovered:

• Credential Harvesting: Mimikatz packed with Themida encryption, DonPAPI for DPAPI credential dumping, and PyPyCatz for Python-based credential extraction.
• Network Penetration: NetExec for Active Directory exploitation, PowerHuntShares for privilege analysis, and Subfind for subdomain enumeration.
• Evasion Techniques: RealBlindingEDR for antivirus bypass, JavaScript obfuscation tools, and ScareCrow payload creation framework.
• Remote Access Tools: XenoRAT for system control, SharpRDP for authenticated command execution, and MeshCentral for remote management.
• Cryptocurrency Integration: Bitkub API tools suggesting money laundering capabilities and potential targeting of Thai financial institutions.

Particularly concerning was the affiliate’s collection of exploit tools targeting multiple CVE vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-40444 and CVE-2022-30190 (Follina), indicating active exploitation of known security flaws.

The discovered tools span the entire attack lifecycle, from initial reconnaissance through privilege escalation and data exfiltration, demonstrating the comprehensive nature of modern ransomware operations.

Security Implications and Defensive Measures

The intelligence gathered from this leak provides valuable defensive opportunities for cybersecurity professionals.

Security researchers have identified specific detection signatures and behavioral patterns that can help organizations identify potential Qilin-affiliated attacks before they fully develop.

Key defensive recommendations include monitoring for Themida-packed Mimikatz variants, unusual NetExec usage in unauthorized penetration testing contexts, and suspicious combinations of the identified tools.

Organizations should implement enhanced monitoring for the specific CVE vulnerabilities that appeared in the affiliate’s exploit collection and establish detection rules for the revealed operational patterns.

The incident also highlights the importance of threat intelligence sharing within the cybersecurity community.

The detailed technical analysis emerging from this leak enables security teams to develop more effective countermeasures and attribution methods.

However, it also demonstrates how quickly ransomware groups can adapt their operations when their methods are exposed.

This exposure serves as a reminder that while ransomware groups present significant threats, their operations remain vulnerable to internal disputes and operational security failures that can provide crucial intelligence for defensive purposes.

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