RedisRaider Campaign Targets Linux Servers by Exploiting Misconfigured Redis Instances

Datadog Security Research has uncovered a formidable new cryptojacking campaign dubbed “RedisRaider,” specifically targeting Linux servers with publicly accessible Redis instances.

This sophisticated Linux worm employs aggressive propagation techniques and advanced obfuscation to exploit vulnerabilities in misconfigured Redis servers, deploying a customized version of the XMRig miner to mine Monero cryptocurrency.

The threat actor behind RedisRaider demonstrates a deep understanding of Redis, Go programming, and Linux internals, orchestrating a multi-faceted attack strategy that extends beyond server-side exploitation to include web-based mining operations.

This campaign sets a new benchmark in the realm of Linux-targeted cryptojacking, combining worm-like behavior with deliberate and well-engineered tactics to maximize its reach and impact across the internet.

A Sophisticated Cryptojacking Worm Emerges

RedisRaider initiates its attack by scanning randomized segments of the IPv4 address space for Redis servers exposed on the default port 6379, using a custom algorithm to identify potential targets.

Upon locating a vulnerable host, it issues the INFO command to confirm a Linux environment before exploiting the system via Redis’s SET and CONFIG commands.

These commands are abused to inject malicious cron jobs by writing a base64-encoded shell script into a Redis key with a short 120-second TTL an anti-forensics measure to evade detection.

The script downloads the primary payload, a heavily obfuscated Go-based x86-64 ELF binary, to /tmp/mysql, which then unpacks and deploys the embedded XMRig miner at runtime.

Further obfuscation is achieved through Garble, a compile-time obfuscator for Go, which scrambles symbols to hinder static analysis, alongside custom packing routines and string encryption to conceal the miner payload.

Technical Intricacies of Exploitation and Evasion

The malware also manipulates Redis configurations, such as disabling compression and altering working directories to /etc/cron.d, ensuring persistence via cron-scheduled execution while erasing traces of its presence with commands like del t.

Beyond server exploitation, the campaign’s infrastructure hosts an in-browser Monero miner on a South Korean web server, revealing a broader monetization strategy that capitalizes on both direct infections and web-based mining, significantly amplifying revenue potential for the threat actor.

This multi-pronged approach underscores the operational maturity of the attacker, who also attempts authentication with hardcoded credentials on secured Redis instances and employs concurrent Goroutines for rapid scanning and exploitation.

The primary payload tests network connectivity via httpbin[.]org before resuming its propagation cycle, ensuring continuous spread.

Defenders face a formidable challenge as RedisRaider’s layered defense evasion ranging from runtime unpacking to short-lived database entries complicates post-incident analysis.

According to the Report, Datadog recommends robust countermeasures, including enabling protected mode on Redis to disable the CONFIG command, enforcing strong authentication, restricting access to public-facing services, and deploying continuous monitoring tools like Workload Protection to detect post-exploitation activities such as network utility execution or cron job modifications.

As RedisRaider exemplifies, cryptojacking has evolved from opportunistic to calculated, demanding heightened vigilance to safeguard critical infrastructure.

Indicators of Compromise (IoC)

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