Threat Actors Attacking OpenClaw Configurations to Steal Login Credentials


Cybercriminals have discovered a new attack surface in the world of personal AI assistants. Recent investigations show that infostealers now target OpenClaw configuration files to steal sensitive authentication credentials and personal data.

This marks a dangerous evolution in malware behavior, shifting from traditional browser-based credential theft to harvesting complete AI agent identities and their associated digital contexts.

The attack demonstrates how personal AI tools, increasingly integrated into daily workflows, create new opportunities for data exfiltration that extend far beyond conventional password theft.

The infected machine's directory structure showing the exfiltrated OpenClaw workspace and configuration files (Source - Infostealers)
The infected machine’s directory structure showing the exfiltrated OpenClaw workspace and configuration files (Source – Infostealers)

The stolen data includes critical components that control the AI agent’s operation.

Infostealers analysts identified the attack through Hudson Rock’s monitoring systems, which detected a live infection successfully exfiltrating OpenClaw environment data from a victim’s machine.

The compromised files contained gateway authentication tokens that allow remote connections to the victim’s local OpenClaw instance, cryptographic key pairs used for secure pairing and signing operations, and memory files storing sensitive activity logs and calendar events.

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Unlike targeted malware with specialized modules, this attack used a broad file-grabbing routine that sweeps for sensitive extensions and specific directory names like “.openclaw,” inadvertently capturing the entire operational context of the user’s AI assistant.

Snapshot of the exfiltrated openclaw.json, revealing authentication profiles and local gateway tokens (Source - Infostealers)
Snapshot of the exfiltrated openclaw.json, revealing authentication profiles and local gateway tokens (Source – Infostealers)

The most dangerous aspect involves the theft of device.json, which contains both public and private cryptographic keys for the user’s device.

These keys enable secure pairing within the OpenClaw ecosystem, but in attacker hands, they allow message signing as the victim’s device, potentially bypassing “Safe Device” security checks and granting access to encrypted logs or paired cloud services.

The exfiltrated soul.md file and memory documents provide attackers with detailed blueprints of the victim’s life, including behavioral patterns, private messages, and upcoming events that the AI agent has learned over time.

Attack Mechanism and Data Exfiltration Process

The infection mechanism represents a grab-bag approach with targeted impact.

The infostealer did not employ a specialized OpenClaw module but instead relied on existing file-sweeping capabilities designed to locate standard secrets and sensitive data.

When the malware scanned the victim’s system for valuable information, it captured OpenClaw’s workspace directories containing configuration files, authentication tokens, and cryptographic materials.

This opportunistic method suggests that current infostealers can compromise AI agent environments without specific programming for these platforms.

The 'soul.md' file, revealing the AI's behavioral boundaries and level of access to the victim's life (Source - Infostealers)
The ‘soul.md’ file, revealing the AI’s behavioral boundaries and level of access to the victim’s life (Source – Infostealers)

Security experts expect this to change rapidly as AI agents become more common in professional environments.

Malware developers will likely release dedicated modules specifically designed to decrypt and parse these files, similar to existing capabilities for Chrome browser data or Telegram credentials.

The stolen openclaw.json file acts as the central nervous system for the agent, containing the victim’s email address, workspace path, and high-entropy gateway tokens.

With these credentials, attackers gain the ability to impersonate the client in authenticated requests to AI gateways, essentially assuming the victim’s digital identity within the AI ecosystem.

Organizations and individuals using AI agents should implement several protective measures. Users need to monitor their systems for unusual file access patterns, particularly in configuration directories.

Encrypting sensitive configuration files at rest can prevent plain-text credential exposure during exfiltration attempts.

Regular rotation of authentication tokens and cryptographic keys limits the window of opportunity for attackers exploiting stolen credentials.

Network segmentation that restricts AI agent gateway access to authorized devices adds another defensive layer against remote exploitation.

As AI assistants transition from experimental tools to essential productivity platforms, the security implications of their compromise will continue growing, making proactive defense strategies increasingly critical.

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