A sophisticated social engineering campaign that weaponizes fake voicemail notifications to trick victims into installing remote access tools.
The attack begins when victims receive communications directing them to compromised websites displaying convincing voicemail-themed landing pages.
These pages use bank-related subdomains and minimal, professional design elements to appear legitimate. The interface suggests that a new voice message is available and prompts users to listen to it, mimicking the routine notification systems most people encounter.
This emerging threat, first detected on January 12, 2026, has compromised 86 web properties delivering German-language voicemail lures that ultimately grant attackers persistent control over infected systems.
The simplicity of the presentation is intentional. By avoiding flashy graphics or urgent warnings, the attackers create an environment that feels trustworthy and unremarkable, reducing the victim’s natural suspicion.
The Technical Execution
When users interact with the landing page, they unknowingly download a Windows BAT (batch) file disguised as a media or audio-related update.
Upon execution, this script displays benign update messages and instructs victims to approve any security prompts that appear.
This psychological conditioning normalizes the approval process, making users more likely to grant the necessary permissions.
As the script runs, it retrieves an audio file from Amazon Web Services (AWS) cloud storage and plays it in a minimized browser window.
The audio, ironically in English rather than German despite the German-language interface, serves as a decoy. While victims focus on this seemingly legitimate voicemail playback, the real damage occurs in the background.
Behind the scenes, the BAT file installs Remotely RMM, a legitimate remote monitoring and management tool that businesses typically use for IT support.

However, in this campaign, the installation enrolls the victim’s system into an attacker-controlled environment hosted at a malicious command-and-control server.
Analysis reveals that infected systems communicate with the attacker’s infrastructure, establishing persistent remote access.
This grants operators complete control over compromised hosts, enabling them to execute additional malicious activities such as lateral movement across networks, data exfiltration, credential theft, or deployment of secondary payloads like ransomware.
Why This Attack Works
This campaign succeeds because it exploits human psychology rather than technical vulnerabilities.

The voicemail theme leverages familiarity most people regularly check voice messages and trust these notifications. The use of legitimate tools like Remotely RMM tool helps evade security software that might otherwise flag unknown malware.
The multi-stage approach also provides plausible deniability at each step. The audio playback creates sensory confirmation that the user’s action was legitimate, while the installation prompts appear routine rather than suspicious.
Organizations and individuals should implement several defensive measures. Verify unexpected voicemail notifications through official channels before clicking links. Disable execution of BAT files from downloads unless absolutely necessary.
Deploy endpoint detection and response solutions that monitor for unauthorized RMM tool installations. Conduct regular security awareness training emphasizing social engineering tactics.
This campaign demonstrates how attackers continue evolving their methods, combining legitimate tools with psychological manipulation to bypass both technical defenses and human vigilance.
The simplicity of the attack makes it particularly dangerous, as it requires minimal technical sophistication while delivering maximum impact.
IOCs
| Type | Indicator |
|---|---|
| Domain | bannerbank[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]bannerbank[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | smbk[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]smbk[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | allsouthfcu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]allsouthfcu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | coastalccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]coastalccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | royalcu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]royalcu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | ulstersavingsbnk[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]ulstersavingsbnk[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | rallycuu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]rallycuu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | landmarkcuu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]landmarkcuu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | vaccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]vaccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | blazeccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
| Domain | www[.]blazeccu[.]cadillac[.]ps |
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