TheWizards Deploy ‘Spellbinder’ for Global Adversary-in-the-Middle Assaults

TheWizards Deploy 'Spellbinder' for Global Adversary-in-the-Middle Assaults

ESET researchers have uncovered sophisticated attack techniques employed by a China-aligned threat actor dubbed “TheWizards,” which has been actively targeting entities across Asia and the Middle East since 2022.

The group employs a custom lateral movement tool called Spellbinder that performs adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks using IPv6 SLAAC spoofing, allowing attackers to redirect legitimate software updates to malicious servers.

China-aligned APT Group’s Sophisticated Attack Infrastructure

TheWizards has developed a comprehensive attack strategy focused primarily on victims in the Philippines, Cambodia, United Arab Emirates, mainland China, and Hong Kong.

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According to ESET telemetry, the group targets individuals, gambling companies, and various organizations across these regions.

TheWizards Deploy 'Spellbinder' for Global Adversary-in-the-Middle Assaults
Geographical distribution of the victims, according to ESET telemetry

Their attack infrastructure involves deploying Spellbinder on compromised networks to intercept traffic and redirect update protocols from legitimate Chinese software to attacker-controlled servers.

The attackers then deliver WizardNet, their signature backdoor, which functions as a modular implant connecting to remote controllers to execute malicious .NET modules on compromised systems.

In a recent case documented by ESET, the update process of Tencent QQ software was hijacked to deliver the malware.

“Our research led us to discover a tool used by the attackers that is designed to perform adversary-in-the-middle attacks,” explained ESET researcher Facundo Muñoz.

Technical Analysis of the Spellbinder AitM Mechanism

Spellbinder employs an IPv6 SLAAC spoofing technique that exploits commonly overlooked network misconfigurations in IPv4 and IPv6 coexistence.

The tool sends multicast Router Advertisement packets to “all nodes” on the network, causing Windows machines with IPv6 enabled to autoconfigure using information provided in the RA message.

TheWizards Deploy 'Spellbinder' for Global Adversary-in-the-Middle Assaults
Illustration of the SLAAC attack carried out by Spellbinder

The attack vector leverages the Network Discovery Protocol in IPv6, with Spellbinder advertising itself as an IPv6-capable router. It provides specific DNS server addresses (240e:56:4000:8000::11 and 240e:56:4000:8000::22) that are part of AS4134 from China Telecom Backbone.

When DNS queries are issued for targeted domains-including popular Chinese platforms like Tencent, Baidu, and others-Spellbinder crafts and sends DNS answer messages redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled IP addresses.

TheWizards Deploy 'Spellbinder' for Global Adversary-in-the-Middle Assaults
Result of the Windows ipconfig command, before and after running Spellbinder

This technique allows TheWizards to perform stealthy man-in-the-middle attacks without requiring ISP compromise, making it particularly effective for lateral movement within targeted organizations.

ESET’s investigation revealed connections between TheWizards and Sichuan Dianke Network Security Technology (also known as UPSEC), a Chinese cybersecurity company.

While TheWizards primarily uses the WizardNet backdoor for Windows systems, their hijacking server is also configured to deliver a backdoor called DarkNights to Android devices.

According to NCSC UK, UPSEC is linked to malware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur communities. Intelligence Online identified UPSEC as the supplier of the DarkNights backdoor (also known as DarkNimbus), which shares infrastructure with TheWizards’ operations.

The sophisticated nature of TheWizards’ tools and tactics represents a significant threat to organizations worldwide.

Their ability to hijack legitimate software update mechanisms from popular Chinese applications demonstrates an advanced persistent threat capability that can bypass conventional security measures.

The group’s continued evolution of tools like Spellbinder since its initial discovery in 2022 indicates ongoing development and operational activity that security teams should monitor closely.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):

Files

SHA-1 Filename ESET detection name Description
9784A1483B4586EB12D86E549D39CA4BB63871B8 minibrowser_shell.dll Win32/Agent.AGNF Downloader component.
4DB38A097AE4D5E70B2F51A8EE13B0C1EE01A2A1 Client.exe MSIL/Agent.DMS WizardNet backdoor.
76953E949AC54BE8FF3A68794EF1419E9EF9AFCB ipv6.exe Win64/Agent.CAZ Spellbinder tool (2022).
DA867188937698C7769861C72F5490CB9C3D4F63 N/A Win64/Agent.CAZ Spellbinder tool (2023), loaded in memory.
0CBA19B19DF9E2C5EBE55D9DE377D26A1A51B70A wsc.dll Win64/Agent.EUO Loads shellcode from log.dat.
1A8147050AF6F05DEA5FBCA1AE1FF2FFD2B68F9C log.dat Win32/Rozena.BXT Shellcode that loads Spellbinder.
2D376ADF44DBD9CF5DB08884E76192D0BC9984C4 plugin-audiofirstpiece.ml Android/Spy.Agent.EFF ZIP archive containing DarkNights for Android.
5B70A853D8E989AD102D639FBF7636B697313ABC classes.dex Android/Spy.Agent.EFF DarkNights for Android.

Network

IP Domain Provider First seen Details
43.155.116[.]7 hao[.]com ACEVILLEPTELTD-SG 2022‑11‑06 Server issuing malicious updates to legitimate applications in 2022. Used by Spellbinder.
43.155.62[.]54 vv.ssl-dns[.]com ACEVILLEPTELTD-SG 2022‑11‑29 Server issuing malicious updates to legitimate applications in 2023 and 2024. Used by Spellbinder.
43.135.35[.]84 mkdmcdn[.]com ACE-SG 2023‑11‑15 WizardNet C&C server.
103.243.181[.]120 assetsqq[.]com HK Kwaifong Group Limited 2021‑07‑15 DarkNights C&C server.
111.13.100[.]92 N/A CHINAMOBILE-CN 2021‑07‑15 DarkNights C&C server.

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