A recent federal indictment accuses Ping Li, a 59-year-old resident of Wesley Chapel, Florida, of conspiring to act as an agent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) without knowledge of the Attorney General.
The charges stem from his alleged cooperation with China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) over a decade-long period, during which he reportedly gathered sensitive information on various topics of interest to the Chinese government. Li faces a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison if convicted.
Allegations of Covert Activities by Ping Li
According to court documents, the PRC’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) uses cooperative contacts located in countries outside of China to further their intelligence goals. These contacts assist the MSS in various ways, including conducting research on topics of interest to the PRC and providing information to the MSS. Li, a U.S. citizen who immigrated from China, allegedly worked as a cooperative contact for the MSS from since at least 2012.
In the indictment, Li is alleged to have worked for major U.S. tech companies while simultaneously serving as a “cooperative contact” for the MSS. Prosecutors claim he used anonymous online accounts to communicate with Chinese intelligence officers and even traveled to China for in-person meetings.
The scope of Li’s alleged activities is broad. He’s accused of providing information on Chinese dissidents, pro-democracy activists, and practitioners of Falun Gong – a spiritual movement banned in China.
Falun Gong is a controversial religion banned within China since 1999, and is not among the five religions officially recognized by the Chinese government. Practitioners of the religion are of particular focus by the Chinese government, as it has been deemed to be subversive and contrary to state interests.
However, these charges against Li have been labelled as alleged, and the press statement includes the below disclaimer:
An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
Corporate Espionage Concerns
The indictment also raises alarms about potential corporate espionage. Li allegedly shared information about his employers, including details about a U.S. telecommunications company’s operations in China and materials from an international IT firm where he later worked.
In a particularly concerning allegation, Li is accused of providing Chinese intelligence with information about hacking events targeting U.S. companies, including a high-profile breach attributed to the Chinese government. This information is alleged to include materials relating to cybersecurity training and readiness of these companies.
According to the press release on the official justice.gov site, the information requested from the MSS over the years spanning 2012 to 2022 include:
- An MSS officer requested in August 2012 for information on the practitioners of Falun Gong within the United States.
- In March 2015, Li was asked to provide details about his U.S. telecommunications employer’s branch offices in China. He reportedly complied within three weeks.
- Two years later, in March 2017, an MSS officer requested a training instruction plan. Li allegedly uploaded the materials to a shared online account the following month, instructing the officer to delete them after review.
- May 2021 saw a request for information on hacking incidents targeting U.S. companies, including a high-profile breach attributed to the Chinese government. Li purportedly delivered this information within four days.
- In March 2022, Li was asked about his new employer, an international IT company, and for cybersecurity training materials. He allegedly provided this information on the same day.
- The most recent request, in June 2022, concerned an individual who had fled China for the U.S. Li reportedly responded with information about the property owners at the suspected U.S. address.
The case is under ongoing investigation from the FBI and is an example of the difficulty in countering foreign suspected espionage activities within the United States against individuals with U.S. citizenship employed as seasoned professionals.