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Active Exploitation of SolarWinds Web Help Desk RCE Used to Drop Custom Malware


Threat actors are actively exploiting critical vulnerabilities in SolarWinds Web Help Desk (WHD) to deploy custom malware and establish persistent remote control.

Security researchers observed these attacks starting on February 7, 2026, targeting organizations that had not yet applied the latest security patches.

SolarWinds Web Help Desk RCE

The intrusion leverages recently disclosed Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, specifically CVE-2025-40551 and CVE-2025-26399.

Researchers at Huntress observed that the attack begins when the WHD service wrapper (wrapper.exe) spawns a Java process to execute malicious commands.

This process silently installs a Zoho ManageEngine RMM agent via a Windows Installer (MSI) payload hosted on the file-sharing service Catbox.

domain reconnaissance and MSI payload delivery spawned from the WHD service process (TOOLSIQ.EXE) -Source: Huntress

Once installed, the Zoho agent acts as a backdoor, configured for unattended access and linked to an attacker-controlled Proton Mail account.

This legitimate remote management tool allows adversaries to maintain hands-on access to the compromised environment without raising immediate alarms.

A defining feature of this campaign is the abuse of legitimate software for malicious purposes.

 Timeline of the attacker’s activities - Source: Huntress
 Timeline of the attacker’s activities – Source: Huntress

After establishing a foothold, the attackers deploy Velociraptor, an open-source digital forensics tool typically used by defenders.

In this context, an outdated version of Velociraptor is weaponized as a Command and Control (C2) framework, communicating with a malicious Cloudflare Worker domain to execute PowerShell commands on the victim’s machine.

To manage their victims, the attackers utilize a custom PowerShell script that harvests system information, such as OS version and domain membership.

In an ironic twist, this data is formatted and exfiltrated directly to an attacker-controlled Elastic Cloud instance.

The threat actors are essentially using a legitimate SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) platform to triage their compromised targets.

Advanced Persistence and Evasion

The campaign exhibits sophisticated tradecraft to ensure the attack survives defensive countermeasures:

  • Defense Evasion: The attackers execute registry modifications to forcibly disable Windows Defender, turning off real-time monitoring and anti-spyware protections.
  • C2 Failover: The malware includes a unique redundancy script. It periodically probes a specific dynamic DNS domain. If the server returns a particular HTTP 406 error code, the script automatically rewrites the Velociraptor configuration file to switch the command-and-control servers. This allows attackers to rotate infrastructure instantly if their primary domain is blocked.

Organizations using SolarWinds Web Help Desk should immediately verify the installed version at C:Program FilesWebHelpDeskversion.txt.

All versions before 12.8.7 HF1 are vulnerable. Administrators must immediately apply the official SolarWinds update to close this critical security gap.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

ItemDescription
https://files.catbox[.]moe/tmp9fc.msi
SHA256:897eae49e6c32de3f4bfa229ad4f2d6e56bcf7a39c6c962d02e5c85cd538a189
Zoho Meetings Installer
https://vdfccjpnedujhrzscjtq.supabase[.]co/storage/v1/object/public/image/v4.msi
SHA256:

46831be6e577e3120084ee992168cca5af2047d4a08e3fd67ecd90396393b751

Velociraptor Installer
https://auth.qgtxtebl.workers[.]dev/Velociraptor Server URL
https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases/latest/download/cloudflared-windows-amd64.msiCloudfared Installer
https://vdfccjpnedujhrzscjtq.supabase[.]co/storage/v1/object/public/image/code.txt
C:ProgramDataMicrosoftcode.exe
SHA256:34b2a6c334813adb2cc70f5bd666c4afbdc4a6d8a58cc1c7a902b13bbd2381f4
Portable version of VSCode
https://62c4cbb992274c32922cfbb49d623bd1.us-central1.gcp.cloud.es[.]ioElastic Search URL
esmahyft@proton[.]meZoho Assist Account Email
v2-api.mooo[.]comVelociraptor Failover Domain
client.config.yaml

SHA256:

bbd6e120bf55309141f75c85cc94455b1337a1a4333f6868b245b2edfa97ef44

Velociraptor Config File
Task Path:C:WindowsSystem32TasksTPMProfiler
Command:C:Users[user]tmpqemu-system-x86_64.exe -m 1G -smp 1 -hda vault.db -device e1000,netdev=net0 -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::22022-:22
Scheduled Task (persistence)
Task Path:C:WindowsSystem32TasksTPMProfiler
Command:C:Users[user]localqemu-system-x86_64 -m 1G -smp 1 -hda bisrv.dll -device e1000,netdev=net0 -netdev user,id=net0,hostfwd=tcp::32567-:22
Scheduled Task (persistence)

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