The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group are urging governments and organizations to immediately begin transitioning to post-quantum cryptography, warning that quantum computing poses an urgent threat to current public-key encryption systems. The document focuses on risks posed by cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs), reaffirming collective efforts to address the threat.
In a document published Thursday titled ‘Preparing for the Post-Quantum Era: A Call to Action,’ the G7 Cyber Security Working Group’s call to action outlines five priorities for a successful PQC transition, including raising awareness of quantum risks and importance of PQC; developing national strategies that support PQC adoption and integration; and advancing research and development for quantum-safe technologies. They also seek to foster public-private partnerships to share expertise and resources, and integrate PQC into cybersecurity requirements and procurement processes.
Although the exact timeline for cryptographically relevant quantum computers remains uncertain, the group said the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography cannot wait, as malicious actors are already conducting ‘store now, decrypt later’ attacks by intercepting and storing encrypted data today for future decryption.
The G7 Cyber Security Working Group is composed of Canada’s Communications Security Establishment, France’s Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI), Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security, Italy’s Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale (ACN), Japan’s National Cybersecurity Office, the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre, and the CISA, with participation of the EU Commission – supported by the EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA).
“Once CRQCs become available to threat actors, organizations will be at risk. Therefore, the transition to PQC is essential to protect organizations, confidential data, authentication mechanisms, and critical assets,” according to the document. “The transition to PQC being a long process, it is essential for organizations to acknowledge the risks and the necessity of preparing their transition now. Even though estimates for the availability of a CRQC vary, key risks exist today.”
Malicious cyber actors can already intercept and store encrypted data protected by public-key cryptography. This attack is known as ‘store now, decrypt later’ or ‘harvest now, decrypt later’ and is relevant where confidentiality of information must be protected for longer than the time required to develop a CRQC (for instance, governmental data, sensitive personal data, trade or business secrets). This means that organizations may already be exposed to the threat today.
The document added that malicious cyber actors with access to CRQCs will also be able to target authentication mechanisms that help provide assurance and protect data integrity between communicating parties and device integrity. This capability could allow malicious cyber actors to impersonate trusted entities, compromise equipment, forge trusted data, or access confidential data, undermining confidence in secure communications or contractual agreements. As supply chain risks can cascade and compromises to authentication can allow immediate lateral movement, the vulnerabilities of one organization may expose other organizations and sectors to these risks.
Organizations and governments must adopt a phased, risk-based strategy that identifies systems holding critical data and assets, while prioritizing PQC transition efforts accordingly, according to the G7 statement. Starting transitions early and inventorying cryptographic systems before quantum computers become available to threat actors is essential, as acting proactively rather than waiting for confirmed CRQC availability is critical to managing quantum risk.
As laid down in the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group Statement on preparing for a post-quantum cryptography migration, organizations should adopt a phased and risk-based strategy; start their PQC transition early; inventory their cryptographic assets; map their dependencies; and develop a transition plan. To limit transition-related costs, they should opt to purchase products that integrate PQC and replace their systems with quantum-safe ones as part of their standard renewal schedule.
As such, starting the transition early could result in lower migration costs overall. Planning and conducting their PQC transition properly would enable organizations to prevent insecure implementations and avoid increased exposure to conventional cyber threats. Achieving a timely and effective transition to PQC requires coordinated action across governments and industry. While organizations must act now to mitigate their own risks, governments play a critical role in creating the conditions for scalable, secure, and interoperable adoption. Organizations are already implementing actions to support this transition, although the scope and pace of these efforts remain closely linked to the infrastructure, regulatory environment, and technological maturity of each country.
The statement recognized that the G7 countries are individually advancing some or all of the initiatives in five priority areas, each of which includes key considerations to take into account when implementing one or more of them. Raising awareness represents a critical priority area, as the quantum threat remains off the radar for many organizations and is not properly resourced, with other security concerns taking precedence.
A successful and collective transition to PQC can only be achieved if organizations understand that the quantum threat is an economic and business risk, not merely a cryptographic risk. To address this lack of awareness, the benefits of PQC and the risks it mitigates can be highlighted by launching awareness campaigns, providing technical guidance, and encouraging the upskilling of organizations. Strategies relating to raising awareness should align with wider strategies for managing cyber risk.
Additionally, national strategies on transitioning to PQC should aim at both attaining an adequate supply of PQC hardware and software products and encouraging users to adopt them. The transition to PQC should also be considered in broader initiatives, including security and digital privacy strategies, ensuring that cryptographic modernization aligns with overall government policy objectives.
Research and development efforts should focus on advancing PQC through innovation and the development of practical solutions. These efforts can include funding programs for research and development of PQC and supporting pilot projects and testbeds for organizations transitioning to PQC, accelerating the pace of technological advancement while enabling real-world testing before widespread deployment.
The document also laid down that cooperation between government, industry, and academia is a key factor to support coordinated transition efforts. The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group recommends those partnerships be aimed at developing domestic expertise and industry capabilities in quantum-safe technologies; such measures may help reduce the cost of PQC transition. The Working Group also recommends countries encourage collaboration between organizations within and across sectors to share resources, expertise, insights, and the development of playbooks and case studies, creating an ecosystem of shared learning and best practices.
Furthermore, countries should treat PQC adoption as a foreseeable evolution of cryptographic best practices rather than a standalone compliance obligation. Furthermore, introducing specific requirements within framework of public procurement can encourage organizations to initiate the transition, both for products and services they offer on the market and within their own operations, using government purchasing power as a lever to drive industry-wide adoption.
In conclusion, the G7 Cyber Security Working Group wrote that “tackling the risks that the impending quantum computing era poses to current cryptographic systems, and ultimately organizations in which they are embedded, requires a coordinated global effort to transition to PQC. To strengthen collective resilience and safeguard confidential data, supply chains, and critical systems, public and private organizations must jointly act now. The transition to PQC is the key foundation to help build a secure and resilient digital future.”
