GBHackers

Iran-Linked Hackers Wipe IT and Recovery Systems in Middle East Cyberattack


Iran-linked hackers have launched a destructive cyber campaign that wipes IT, backup, and recovery systems at multiple organizations in the Middle East and beyond, severely undermining victims’ ability to restore operations after an attack.

Evidence ties the operation to the long-running Iranian threat group Black Shadow, believed to work on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

Threat intelligence analysis shows the campaign, dubbed “Ababil of Minab,” targets organizations in the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other Middle Eastern countries.

The operators combine large-scale data exfiltration with systematic destruction of virtual infrastructure, databases, operating systems, and backup repositories.

The activity surfaced publicly after a pro-Iran persona calling itself “Ababil of Minab” claimed responsibility for attacks on Los Angeles Metro and other entities, publishing videos of live destruction operations as proof.

Forensic links connect this persona’s infrastructure and tooling to previous Black Shadow operations, indicating it is likely a rebranding rather than a new independent crew.

The attackers deliberately targeted every layer needed for recovery: virtualization, storage, databases, application servers, and backup platforms.

In one Middle East–focused case at UNIMAC, a Saudi maintenance and contracting company, the operator wiped Windows volumes through Disk Management, formatting and then deleting partitions before recreating a new “Minab” volume to overwrite prior data.

They then pivoted to the Veeam Backup & Replication console. They used the “Delete from disk” action to erase entire backup chains from repository storage, eliminating recovery points that might have saved the environment.

Gambit team said in a report shared with GBhackers, investigated an intrusion campaign involving exfiltration and destruction targeting organizations in the United States,Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

Backup chain deletion (Source : Gambit).

In another victim environment, they ran a custom Python script, main.py, which iterated through 58 SQL Server instances and executed commands to forcibly drop all user databases, achieving 58 of 58 successful destructive operations while manually deleting backup .bak files in parallel.

Iran-Linked Hackers Wipe IT

Rather than relying only on malware, the threat actor abused the same management tools defenders use every day, including VMware vCenter, Windows Disk Management, SQL Server Management Studio, and Windows Explorer, to blend in with legitimate administrator activity.

Scripted SQL Server database deletion via main.py (Source : Gambit).
Scripted SQL Server database deletion via main.py (Source : Gambit).

Videos show the operator deleting virtual machines directly from vCenter, taking databases offline and then deleting them, and permanently removing core folders such as Windows, Program Files, Users, and the IIS web root from critical servers, causing immediate loss of connectivity.

In a striking detail, the attackers briefly revealed that they were using ChatGPT to refine their destruction scripts, specifically tuning logic to avoid system databases and target only application data, which increased impact while keeping Windows and SQL infrastructure just functional enough to complete the attack.

Before wiping systems, Ababil of Minab exfiltrated large volumes of data from victims in Israel, Turkey, and other Middle Eastern sectors, including media, higher education, insurance, and online services.

In some cases, they compressed stolen files into multi-part RAR archives and uploaded them into the victim’s own public web root, then pulled them back out using the axel download accelerator tunneled through proxychains.

The group also operated a custom Flask-based exfiltration receiver that accepted encrypted file chunks via multiple endpoints and reassembled them server-side.

Although the client encrypted filenames and data with AES-CBC, the key and IV were transmitted in the same request, meaning the encryption provided no real protection against anyone monitoring the traffic path.


Relationship to Previous Iran linked Activity (Source : Gambit).
Relationship to Previous Iran linked Activity (Source : Gambit).

Infrastructure used in this campaign overlaps with a 2025 Iranian operation that deployed a fake mental health support site, nefeshhope.com, to target Israeli soldiers and reservists.

That influence-espionage campaign was previously associated with Black Shadow based on custom Go tunneler samples and command-and-control hosting.

The reuse of staging servers, TLS certificates, and tunneling tools between the fake support site and the new destructive and exfiltration activity provides strong continuity between these operations.

For defenders in the Middle East, this underscores that the same Iran-linked cluster now combines psychological operations, espionage, and outright destructive attacks against critical IT and recovery infrastructure.

Indicators of Compromise

IndicatorTypeNotes
31.172.87.20IPv4Operator staging server; served TLS for nefeshhope[.]com
212.83.61.213IPv4FileFiend C2, hardcoded in 81a2535
66.85.26.183IPv4FileFiend C2, hardcoded in c8cc422 and 33a6b49
195.20.17.129IPv4FileFiend C2, hardcoded in d76a943
46.246.125.131IPv4Source IP of propaganda site
146.70.233.83IPv4Served TLS for nefeshhope[.]com
91.193.19.198IPv4Attacker-controlled exit node
89.36.231.56IPv4Served TLS for feedback.nefeshhope[.]com
84.200.89.52IPv4Served TLS for nefeshhope[.]com
46.30.190.173IPv4Served TLS for members.nefeshhope[.]com
nefeshhope[.]comDomainOperator-controlled site
members.nefeshhope[.]comDomainCommunicating with A.ExE Go tunneler
81a25357d027d0f04a43139377d5d58384b8e9b0770e699cdcc37e600641cf90SHA-256FileFiend / Exchangedb.exe
c8cc4225d1e21324ef419adbb1c10dd0578fb034b5f5d7b8000f0aae1871c061SHA-256FileFiend / Exchangedb.exe
33a6b4900c2fbfb3c2d816947871eade800d0c0e2a2680871700fd6e640e5f20SHA-256FileFiend / Exchangedb.exe
d76a94309240a7e2f11a89fab54a6853628e976a5ff19084b1b0894c89e6a742SHA-256FileFiend
f6db77be038980e9dbbf9f11e0f7ae7d2d4d3f1a53199958f1f55137dde5efd3SHA-256A.ExE Go tunneler communicating with members.nefeshhope[.]com
C:UserscasioDesktopuploader v3temp uploader v3temp uploader v3.cppFile PathDeveloper source path in FileFiend
F:OH~FileFiend(Uploader)uploader v3x64Releasetemp uploader v3.pdbFile PathPDB path in FileFiend v4
O=Acme Cloud Solutions Inc, CN=localhostTLS SubjectSelf-signed certificate on Flask receiver

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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