Legacy IRC Botnet Leverages Automated SSH Exploit Pipeline to Mass-Enroll Linux Hosts


Identified through data captured by our SSH honeypots over two months, this campaign represents a sophisticated blend of eras. It merges “old-school” Internet Relay Chat (IRC) botnet tactics from the late 2000s with modern, automated mass-compromise techniques.

While the infrastructure resembles known threats, SSHStalker is a distinct operation focused on resilience and scale rather than stealth.

What makes SSHStalker unique is its “living off the land” approach to deployment. Rather than simply dropping a pre-made virus, the attacker creates an automated pipeline on the victim’s machine:

  1. The Entry: The attack begins with a Golang-based binary (disguised as nmap) that scans for servers with open SSH ports (Port 22).
  2. The Build: Once access is gained, the malware downloads the GCC compiler. It then drops raw C source code files onto the victim’s server and compiles the malware on the spot.
  3. The Connection: The newly compiled bots immediately connect to an IRC server. This allows the attackers to control thousands of infected machines using chat channels a legacy method that remains highly effective for redundancy.

Flare’s research team has uncovered a undocumented Linux botnet operation dubbed SSHStalker.

Persistence: The 60-Second Watchdog

SSHStalker is designed to be incredibly noisy but difficult to remove. The threat actors prioritize keeping the bot alive over staying hidden.

The botnet maintained persistent access without executing any observable impact operations, despite having in its arsenal capabilities to launch DDoS attacks and conduct cryptomining. 

SHStalker’s attack flow (Source : flare).

The kit installs a Cron job (a scheduled task) that runs every single minute. This script acts as a “watchdog.”

It checks if the malware process is running; if a defender or antivirus kills the bot, the watchdog script automatically recompiles and relaunches it within 60 seconds.

This aggressive persistence mechanism ensures the botnet remains stable even if individual processes are terminated.

The research revealed a massive library of exploits targeting Linux Kernel versions 2.6.x vulnerabilities dating back to 2009 and 2010.

While these exploits are ineffective against modern, updated Linux servers, they are devastatingly effective against “long-tail” legacy environments.

This includes forgotten cloud instances, old IoT devices, and unmaintained virtual private servers (VPS).

Flare found evidence of nearly 7,000 compromised IPs, heavily concentrated in cloud hosting environments like Oracle Cloud.

The scan results are heavily dominated by cloud hosting providers, with strong indicators of Oracle Cloud infrastructure, which operates large ASN blocks such as AS31898 and related Oracle network ranges. 

Geo-location distribution of the SSH IP addresses found in the results file (Source : flare).
Geo-location distribution of the SSH IP addresses found in the results file (Source : flare).

The attackers appear to be building a massive network of these legacy systems to mine cryptocurrency (specifically Ethereum Classic) and harvest AWS credentials.

The Romanian Connection

The operational fingerprint of SSHStalker strongly resembles the Outlaw (or Maxlas) botnet group.

The file structures, use of IRC, and specific persistence methods are similar. Furthermore, the kit is full of Romanian-language artifacts, slang, and nicknames.

A screenshot from the “infected machines IRC channel” (Source : flare).
A screenshot from the “infected machines IRC channel” (Source : flare).

However, no direct identifiers linking it to Outlaw were found. This suggests SSHStalker is likely a “copycat” or a derivative group operating in the same ecosystem, utilizing similar toolkits to achieve different ends.

The most distinct red flag for this campaign is the activity of compilers on production servers. Defenders should monitor for the execution of gcc, make, or build tools in directories like /tmp or /dev/shm.

Additionally, blocking outbound IRC traffic and monitoring for Cron jobs that execute every minute can help detect an infection before it becomes a persistent foothold.

Indicators of Compromise

#TypeValueMD5 HashComments / Detection
1ELF fileh320d01bd11d1d3e7676613aacb109de55fProchider rootkit
2ELF fileh641e288bb6920d9cf07d0e5dbc8614469dProchider rootkit
3ELF filerun3232ee52b2918e06e3925eaccb0bea2d66IRCbot
4ELF filerun6488a31724d376ba7ac8ce5c10f97da83dIRCbot
5ELF filenmapf8f76d8772f07b716913ba85f3af8380Classified as payload (scanned under cr4myx.exe)
6Shell fileautorun5b9d4ff6a89da88dcf1d7d04b6d1e976Creates cron persistence and runs “run”
7Shell filego4c3d248b1fc8d4963ebdded4aecfcb8eWin.Trojan.Tsunami-5
8Shell filerun70677ce8be9ebc5f81c299f753b98d66Runs the rootkits
9Shell fileupdate26ad93d703a565a2642c422b2434fc78
10Tar filebootbou.tgz98f1ac9c9baf2562eb00b7d4f89dc0dcContains malware and scripts
11IP address64.227.142.133Marked malicious; no specific detections
12C file1.c6ca73134ee02fb373ebaf9321b9840c8Win.Trojan.Tsunami-5
13C file2.ca24cabef282713b6c0e3f9c3efdabd91Win.Trojan.Tsunami-5
14Zip filegs.zip3b64c2ecd7ea152f9d4af9d0461db265Contains malware and scripts
15Tar filegs.tarfb2ddb699bed59ff420b43f5640e7e0cContains malware and scripts
16C filea.ca8d19e08aa022bacd8a76777874fad8aWin.Trojan.Tsunami-5
17Perl filebot1d4c9039ca7e0b3e93c708f5d02f92a0Win.Trojan.Tsunami-5
18C fileclean.c077cdcbe6c1bf4a0f4bc81feaf283be3Clean access records and logs
19C filecls.c2b31ba929f3e4f8e8c84b3815b0e4909Cleans login logs
20Shell filedistro94e513b01f26399ae16ac91b50fde268
21Shell filegofd55f0754084ba041539bb469f06a83d
22C fileping.c4777d24c864c04a6bfabb836811edf2dPrivileged backdoor
23IP address185.243.218.59IRC channels #xx and #SIP
24IP address154.35.175.201IRC channels #xx and #SIP
25IP address94.125.182.255IRC channels #xx and #SIP
26IP address23.228.66.219IRC channels #xx and #SIP
27IP address199.71.214.87IRC channels #xx and #SIP
28IP address172.83.156.122IRC channels #xx and #SIP
29Domainirc.undernet.orgIRC channels #xx and #SIP
30Domainplm.ftp.shIRC channels #xx and #SIP
31Domaingsm.ftp.shIRC channels #xx and #SIP

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