CyberSecurityNews

New DriveSurge Threat Actor Uses ClickFix and Fake Updates to Infect Website Visitors


A newly identified threat actor named DriveSurge has been quietly compromising thousands of legitimate websites to push malware onto unsuspecting visitors.

Using a combination of fake browser update pages and a social engineering trick known as ClickFix, this operation ran largely undetected until now.

What makes DriveSurge especially dangerous is not just its scale, but the deep sophistication built into its infrastructure to automate malware delivery at massive scale.

DriveSurge works by injecting malicious code into high-reputation, legitimate websites without the knowledge of site owners or their visitors.

When someone visits one of these compromised sites, hidden code quietly routes them through a Traffic Distribution System, or TDS. This system profiles each visitor and decides what to serve them next, making the attack feel natural and highly targeted at the same time.

shared with Cyber Security News that they identified DriveSurge as the primary driver behind a massive surge in ClickFix and Fake Update campaigns across the web.

Temporary email service provider tempmail[.]so provides long-term use services (Source – Silent Push)

According to their analysis, DriveSurge operates as a specialized Initial Access Broker using a Pay-Per-Install model, where payment is collected each time a victim device is successfully infected. Those confirmed infection leads are then sold to other threat actors operating downstream.

Researchers uncovered eight distinct technical fingerprints that map out DriveSurge’s malicious infrastructure, from how scripts are injected into victim sites to the registration patterns used for its domains.

This level of operational detail points to a threat actor that has invested serious time into building a repeatable, scalable infection system. The group has compromised thousands of websites that redirect visitors to malware, all without site owners ever knowing.

The campaign targets a wide range of browsers, including Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge, Safari, Opera, Brave, Yandex, Vivaldi, Samsung Internet, and UC Browser.

Victims encounter either a fake browser update page or a ClickFix prompt, both designed to look completely routine and trustworthy. That familiarity is exactly what makes both methods so effective against everyday users.

New DriveSurge Threat Actor Uses ClickFix and Fake Updates

DriveSurge deploys two main methods to trick users into installing malware on their own devices. In the Fake Update scenario, a compromised site displays a convincing browser update prompt that impersonates a well-known browser.

Clicking the update button triggers the download of a ZIP file containing multiple DLL files and a “Browser Update.exe” file that is actually malware.

Mozilla Firefox Update page triggered on the compromised site (Source - Silent Push)
Mozilla Firefox Update page triggered on the compromised site (Source – Silent Push)

The ClickFix method works differently. A fake error message instructs the victim to copy and paste a command into their terminal or PowerShell window, which then silently installs malware.

In one confirmed instance, the ClickFix prompt tried to pull malicious code from an IP address already flagged in active threat intelligence feeds. Both methods exploit the trust people naturally place in familiar websites and routine-looking browser prompts.

The underlying zTDS infrastructure uses obfuscation techniques, including Base64 encoding and string manipulation, to hide malicious redirect code inside normal-looking page elements.

A failover mechanism cycles through multiple backup servers to ensure the payload reaches the victim even if one delivery domain goes down. Researchers confirmed the TDS has been in active use since at least 2022.

MacOS Targeting and a Cross-Platform Victim Strategy

Analysis of obfuscated JavaScript files tied to DriveSurge revealed the attack chain does not only target Windows machines. One analyzed payload delivered macOS malware, showing that DriveSurge is actively building a cross-platform victim pool.

The payload used a multi-stage shell command that downloaded a secondary file, executed it, and then deleted itself immediately to reduce forensic traces.

Compromised site (Source - Silent Push)
Compromised site (Source – Silent Push)

Researchers also discovered a separate Advertisement Distribution System linked to the campaign. This system collects device metadata and uses behavioral signals like mouse movements, scrolls, and clicks to confirm human presence before delivering content.

Organizations are advised to monitor for unusual external JavaScript injections, audit third-party scripts loading from unrecognized domains, and ensure web-facing content management systems remain fully patched and access-controlled.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicatorDescription
Domainbeacontrace[.]bondMalicious zTDS inject domain serving t.js script
Domainjclforwarding[.]comCompromised site used to serve Fake Update / ClickFix content
Domaincheck[.]first-node[.]rocksMalicious domain serving fake Mozilla Firefox update page
Domaincptoptious[.]comzTDS delivery domain used in obfuscated payload
Domainnewtdsone[.]shopzTDS delivery domain used in obfuscated payload
Domaincaptioto[.]comzTDS delivery domain used in obfuscated payload
Domainbanerpanel[.]liveAdvertisement Distribution System (ADS) panel domain
Domaintestio[.]ecartdev[.]comPayload and development server identified in analysis
Domainycyfugihih[.]cfdDomain linked to DriveSurge registration email pivot
Domainbrightson[.]icuPre-weaponized DriveSurge infrastructure domain
Domaincoverlink[.]icuPre-weaponized DriveSurge infrastructure domain
Domaindatumprobe[.]icuPre-weaponized DriveSurge infrastructure domain
Domainwebgleam[.]infoDomain identified via Fingerprint 3 infrastructure pattern
Domaincptoptions[.]comSuspicious domain loaded into jclforwarding[.]com
Domainbanerpanel[.]liveADS domain serving casino slot machine advertisement
Emailthiagorivera197151[@]ycyfugihih[.]cfdDriveSurge domain registration email (Fingerprint 6 pivot)
Emailsamuel_jordan16[@]flixtrend[.]netSecond DriveSurge domain registration email (Fingerprint 7 pivot)
IP Address46[.]226[.]166[.]57C2 server hosting macOS payload; URL: hxxp://46[.]226[.]166[.]57/ce3cbfc887?force=1
File Hash (SHA256)90aecb370dfb1a99a1f7de0a9c6842ab1b664521fddea16b0ec9a91f322646fcZIP file downloaded via fake Mozilla Firefox update page
File Hash (SHA256)7aa15de93cf85729ddf970e8d7897f69ece3ca29608f73e784a9ba40c9cea18dmacOS payload binary retrieved from C2 server
File Hash (SHA256)29ac78c51bcdfe68c64830bdeb6e41437dd55e2691149741c9b78be03b6c82eaMalicious server body SHA256 (Fingerprint 4)
File Hash (SHA256)a84b032b49773c2318b11b1164d1aada69e940229aedbf8185c33fc7dd1d2cdfMalicious server body SHA256 (Fingerprint 4 alternate)
File Hash (SHA256)428bd0b0ac36dfdd223b3953dbe61c0baf227f893310b03e7afe3111462019c6Data hash linked to jclforwarding[.]com web resources
File Namet.jsMalicious injected JavaScript file (Fingerprint 1 pattern)
File NameBrowser Update.exeFake browser update executable dropped via ZIP file
File Namescript.jsInjected JavaScript file served by check[.]first-node[.]rocks
File Namebanner-js[.]phpScript loaded into compromised sites via banerpanel[.]live
File Namechangelog.txtPublicly accessible file on zTDS server confirming TDS version history
URLhxxps[://]newtdsone[.]shop/jsrepo?rnd=zTDS payload fetch URL embedded in obfuscated JavaScript
URLhxxps[://]cptoptious[.]com/jsrepo?rnd=zTDS payload fetch URL embedded in obfuscated JavaScript
URLhxxps[://]captioto[.]com/jsrepo?rnd=zTDS payload fetch URL embedded in obfuscated JavaScript
URLhxxp://46[.]226[.]166[.]57/ce3cbfc887?force=1C2 URL delivering macOS malware payload

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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