GBHackers

AI-Assisted Hackers Deploy 41 PowerShell Scripts to Steal Credentials From African Stock Exchange


Symantec researchers say attackers probably used an AI-written toolkit to hunt for credentials at an African stock exchange. They ran 41 PowerShell modules in 3 minutes 12 seconds, from 08:44 to 08:47 UTC, under a webshell on an IIS server.

The modules tested credentials, a reused bearer token and API keys against the exchange’s investment API and a securities depository gateway. Symantec could not see the results, so it does not know whether any of the credentials worked.

African stock exchange credential theft

Modules stole Group Policy Preferences passwords and searched SYSVOL, web roots and application directories for AWS keys and database connection strings.

Others checked for cloud credentials and opened a connection to an AWS-hosted database cluster. They also enumerated SharePoint, SCCM and TFS servers and mapped IIS sites and application pools.

Four modules targeted the investment API. They sent a login with a guessed password, reused a bearer token and tested several API keys, including a blank one that may have been a control. They connected by IP address, set the Host header manually and disabled certificate validation.

Exchange Credential Sweep Breakdown (Image Source: Security)

According to a report by Symantec, every module opened with the same error-handling line and the same try/catch. Each hex-encoded its output the same way and returned the same empty-output sentinel.

A DNS exfiltration loop was copied byte for byte into all 41 scripts. A programmer would normally write that once as a shared function.

One module had a progress variable that no other module had. Another submitted an invalid credential as a deliberate test. A new module started every few seconds.

Symantec says no single signal is conclusive, but together they fit AI-assisted authorship better than bespoke tooling. It could not identify the model.

Each module hex-encoded its output and split it into 50-character chunks. It then resolved each chunk as a subdomain under a single token on oast[.]pro, a public out-of-band testing service.

Data left the server as DNS lookups instead of web requests. Whoever controlled the token would have collected it. Defenders can hunt for the shared scaffold and for this loop.

The earliest malicious activity on the server dates to April 2026, and the attackers may have been present longer. Six persistence implants were installed. Symantec attributes them with high confidence to Witchetty (aka LookingFrog), a China-linked espionage group.

ESET first documented Witchetty in April 2022 as part of TA410. Symantec reported in September 2022 that Witchetty hit two Middle Eastern governments and an African stock exchange, using ProxyShell and ProxyLogon to plant webshells.

Symantec does not attribute the toolkit to any group. It could be Witchetty with new tooling, a more capable second operator using the same access, or an unrelated actor. This toolkit is far more advanced than anything previously tied to Witchetty.

The motive is unclear. Probing of the investment API and banking gateway points to financial gain. A check on one specific investor’s number, and interest in source code and employee data, point to espionage.

Symantec found no evidence of privilege escalation or data theft. Symantec Endpoint products block known malicious files, and the Symantec Protection Bulletin lists current protections.



Source link