CyberSecurityNews

AuditTeam Ransomware Gang Poses as Security Auditors and Use AV Drivers to Kill EDR Process


A ransomware group called AuditTeam is dressing up extortion as a paid security audit. Victims get a ransom note that reads like an audit log. It asks for an “Audit & Consulting fee” in return for a report on the holes the attackers used to get in.

Before the note appears, the group has already shut down security tools with a signed antivirus driver and encrypted the files.

The campaign ran from January 2026 through at least October 2026. It hit dozens of organizations, and a recent report on crews that disable EDR shows why this step matters so much to modern ransomware gangs.

Researchers at Securelist, the research arm of Kaspersky, identified the malware and named its framework OpsAgent. They first saw it on March 10, 2026, in an intrusion at a company in Hong Kong.

The tool looked like a normal penetration testing kit. Further digging showed the same tool in other countries.

The Securelist team says AuditTeam’s victims include organizations in Russia, Italy, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Senegal, Finland and China. The group’s leak site also lists victims in Turkey, Thailand, Ukraine, Argentina, South Korea, Japan and Spain.

AuditTeam Ransomware Gang Poses as Security Auditors

The EDR killer is an add-on module for OpsAgent. It installs a driver that poses as Beijing Jiangmin Antivirus, from the KV product series.

The driver carries a valid digital signature, which helps it load without raising alarms. This trick is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver, or BYOVD.

Attackers bring a trusted, signed driver onto a machine and misuse it to run code at the kernel level, where security tools have little power to fight back.

Once the driver is loaded, the malware talks to it through a filter port named KvCorePortX0. When the driver gets the command 0x1D followed by a file name, it ends the matching process.

The kill list holds about 220 names. It covers Microsoft Defender (MsMpEng), ESET (ekrn) and Kaspersky (avp). It also covers monitoring tools such as Sysmon, splunkd and wazuh-agent.

Remote access tools like TeamViewer, backup services such as Veeam and Acronis, and database engines such as sqlservr, mysqld, mongod and redis-server are on it too.

Other gangs use the same idea. Earlier reporting on how GentleKiller abused vulnerable drivers showed one gang killing more than 400 security processes before it encrypted anything.

The ransom note (Source – Securelist)

After the security tools go down, the cryptor module takes over. It encrypts files with AES-CBC or ChaCha20 and gives each file its own key.

It also uses X25519 key exchange, so victims cannot easily recover the keys. The module stops database and backup services, deletes shadow copies and empties the recycle bin.

When it deletes files, it overwrites them with random data first, which makes forensic recovery much harder. The same backup-wrecking habit appears in how DeadLock ransomware targets backups before locking files.

The ransom note says nothing about encryption. Because the cryptor module drops it, anyone who sees the note already has encrypted files.

OpsAgent does a lot. It manages files and processes, injects shellcode, steals tokens, logs keystrokes, takes screenshots and moves between machines.

Securelist says it rivals Cobalt Strike in features. Its loaders push code into msiexec.exe, and the newest Rust loader runs the payload inside its own process instead.

During the campaign, the authors rewrote the implant from C++ to Rust. Securelist also saw code patterns that suggest the authors used AI tools to help write it.

For command and control, the malware uses Amazon CloudFront subdomains. It finds them by reading a public GitHub repository.

Because CloudFront addresses are shared with legitimate traffic, blocking by IP address does not work well. The GitHub repository was removed in November 2026. The latest Rust samples have that feature switched off, so the campaign is probably still running.

Defenders should watch for new kernel driver installs, especially a file named kvcore.sys. They should alert on any security agent that stops reporting while its host stays online.

Turning on Microsoft’s vulnerable driver blocklist and limiting local admin rights also helps. Even trusted vendor tools can be turned against you, as research on how a Microsoft Defender driver abused can disable endpoint protection shows. Keep offline backups, because this gang destroys the online ones.

Indicators of compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicator
File hash (stager)d3e49dceb89a25f5da4ff0c42e996857
File hash (stager)bd4c327ad208cb722ad25e43ea3f35fc
File hash (stager)5d1425ab3dad1d2de053f69529d227e1
File hash (stager)f0d5752054f6b7af1325ea340c4326d0
File hash (stager)83768e994c6bb72d0b430b98a71ec8d6
File hash (driver)109cdc24ccd4872a3e4bf6f2d4f3c3d4
File pathC:ProgramDataMicrosoftWindowsCachessyscache.dat
File pathC:Users{username}AppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsCachessyscache.dat
File pathC:Users{username}AppDataLocalMicrosoftCLR_v4.0syscache.dat
File path{modulepath}syscache.dat
File path{TempPath}syscache.dat
File pathC:UsersPublickv_dbg.log
File pathC:WindowsSysnativedriverskvcore.sys
File pathC:WindowsSystem32driverskvcore.sys
Domaind19v1tntmz2i98[.]cloudfront[.]net
Domaind35htktbyt7nxc[.]cloudfront[.]net
IP address157.20.104[.]111
GitHub C2 pagehxxps://github[.]com/RonaldCMalcolm1983/staticPage

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally Qdefanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms sQuch as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

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