GBHackers

China-Linked Webworm Hackers Deploy Custom SoftEther VPN to Maintain Hidden Access to Government Networks


A newly identified modified SoftEther VPN Bridge that is attributed with moderate confidence to Webworm, a China-aligned espionage group known for targeting government organizations, particularly in Europe.

The November 19 analysis describes a Windows executable that preserves SoftEther’s network bridging capabilities while changing the artifacts defenders use to identify unauthorized deployments.

The discovery builds on earlier reporting about Webworm’s SoftEther VPN deployment at a Serbian government organization. Rapid7 found no separate command-execution backdoor in the analyzed binary.

China-Linked Webworm Hackers Deploy Custom SoftEther VPN

The publicly available sample is a 64-bit Windows Portable Executable based on SoftEther VPN Bridge version 4.44, build 9807. Its metadata lists netcapa.exe as the original filename and presents the executable as “Network Monitor Software.”

Inside the binary, the NtMonitor VPN label appears in service-related strings, firewall rule names, and HTTP error content.

The rebranding is incomplete: researchers recovered an upstream debug-symbol path referencing vpnbridge.pdb, and the executable’s entry point still uses the SEVPNBRIDGE service identifier, giving endpoint investigators clues that the file’s visible branding does not.

The modified bridge changes its HTTP request paths and protocol watermark, a byte pattern used to recognize compatible peers during the handshake.

The replacement makes the sample incompatible with stock SoftEther peers and reduces the value of signatures keyed to the upstream handshake. The binary also embeds a stripped-down copy of hamcore.se2 in its executable resources, removing the need for a separate archive on disk.

That distinction matters because UNC2814’s SoftEther VPN Bridge deployment left hamcore.se2 as a standalone forensic artifact in a separate espionage campaign.

Rapid7 found that the bridge reads setting.conf instead of the upstream vpn_bridge.config. Encrypted configurations begin with the ASCII marker RCEN and carry the key used by the custom RC4-like cipher, making offline recovery possible.

The recovered configurations defined cascade connections that bridged remote networks into local ones. In configurations not considered likely tests, remote endpoints were hosted in AS20473, an autonomous system operated by The Constant Company.

Rapid7 cited that infrastructure’s prior association with Webworm as supporting evidence, not as proof of attribution on its own.

At the time of analysis, only one VirusTotal engine flagged the public sample. Rapid7 released indicators of compromise and YARA rules for identifying the modified binary.

Where authorized TLS inspection exposes HTTP request bodies, defenders can look for POST requests to /update/picture.cgi that declare image/jpeg but begin with a PNG signature.

That mismatch is more discriminating than the request path alone. Endpoint teams investigating renamed SoftEther binaries can correlate executable metadata with service registrations, firewall changes, and outbound connections. Rapid7 cautioned that the branding, request paths, and watermark can change between builds.

Government security teams should therefore investigate whether a suspected bridge is authorized, which local network segments it connects, and whether its remote peer is approved. Those checks remain useful when filenames change, and they help responders determine what the tunnel could have reached.

MITRE ATT&CK techniques

Technique IDTechnique NameComment
T1587.001Develop Capabilities: MalwareThe actor is maintaining their own fork of SoftEther VPN used for malicious purposes.
T1027.013Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded FileConfiguration files are encrypted with a custom cipher.
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEncrypted configuration files are decrypted at startup by the modified loader.
T1036.005Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationPE metadata is purposefully changed to masquerade as a generic system service.
T1027.005Obfuscated Files or Information: Indicator Removal from ToolsKnown SoftEther artifacts are systematically removed from the binary.
T1686.003Disable or Modify System Firewall: Windows Host FirewallUsing stock SoftEther functionality, the malware adds rules to the system firewall.
T1599Network Boundary BridgingThe VPN bridge binds together the infected host’s local area network with the attacker’s.
T1071Application Layer ProtocolC2 communication uses HTTP(S) and SoftEther’s application protocol.
T1090.001Proxy: Internal ProxyThe infected host serves as an internal proxy mediating C2 access to other hosts on the network.

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