In this Help Net Security interview, Christian Schwalbe, CEO of Deutsche Telekom IoT, talks about the forgotten devices that create the most risk in IoT deployments. He explains what the EU Cyber Resilience Act means for manufacturers whose products stay in the field for 15 or 20 years, and how threats can be spotted through communication patterns without inspecting payloads.
Schwalbe also discusses post-quantum cryptography for constrained devices, including research on splitting secrets across terrestrial and satellite paths, and why digital sovereignty depends on understanding and controlling your dependencies.
Deutsche Telekom IoT connects millions of devices across industries. When you look at your network traffic, which kind of device worries you most, the cheap sensor nobody remembers deploying or the high-value industrial controller?
That’s a good question.It’s probably the device nobody thinks about anymore. If you have a critical industrial controller, you usually know it’s important. You know what happens if it fails. You have people responsible for it, and hopefully you have security measures in place.
But now think about a small sensor somewhere in a factory or a warehouse. It was installed years ago, it’s still working, and nobody really pays attention to it. As long as it sends data, everybody is happy. That is where the risk begins.
Attackers are not concerned with the price of a device. They look for weaknesses and opportunities. Even a simple device can create exposure for a wider system.
This is one of the biggest challenges in IoT security. We’re connecting more and more devices, but we also need to make sure we don’t lose visibility and control over them. IoT security cannot end at deployment. It has to be managed throughout the device lifecycle.
The EU Cyber Resilience Act now places obligations on manufacturers for the lifetime of a product. How many of your customers were prepared for that, and how many treated it as a surprise?
I think the Cyber Resilience Act is an important step because it makes cybersecurity and vulnerability handling a responsibility for manufacturers throughout a product’s support period. At the same time, implementing these requirements raises practical questions, especially for long-lived IoT products. The support period needs to reflect how long a product is expected to be used, and manufacturers need workable ways to manage updates and vulnerabilities across devices already in the field.
We’ve been talking about IoT security for years. But if we’re honest, security hasn’t always received the same attention as functionality, costs or time to market. That’s changing now.
I wouldn’t claim that every company was surprised, or that everyone was fully prepared. The reality is more complex. Some manufacturers have been investing in security for a long time. Others are now taking a much closer look at what it means to secure a connected product throughout its lifetime. And that’s the important point.
We’re not talking about securing a device on the day it leaves the factory. We’re talking about products that might operate for ten, fifteen or even twenty years.
What happens when a vulnerability is discovered? Can the software be updated? Who takes responsibility? And how do you manage all of this when thousands of devices are already deployed around the world?
These are real challenges for manufacturers. This is also why we value partnerships like the one we have with Exein. We strongly believe in the importance of security approaches that can help manufacturers protect devices during operation. I believe the CRA will accelerate a change that should have happened anyway: Security needs to become a fundamental part of how connected products are designed, deployed and managed. Not something we add at the end.
How do you handle the tension between inspecting traffic for threats and the privacy expectations of customers and their end users?
For me, security and privacy belong together. You cannot build trust in connected technology if customers feel they have to sacrifice one for the other.
And I think it’s important to understand that effective security doesn’t automatically mean inspecting everything.
There are different ways to identify potential threats. For example, unusual communication patterns can tell you that something might be wrong with a device. Is it suddenly communicating with an unexpected destination? Is its behaviour different from what we normally see?
Communication patterns can sometimes reveal anomalies without requiring inspection of the payload. Of course, even metadata needs to be handled responsibly. We have to be clear about what information is necessary, how it’s processed and who has access to it.
But there’s another aspect. Not every threat is visible in network traffic. Especially with encrypted communications, you need additional security capabilities.
That is why layered security matters. Depending on the architecture, network-level measures can be complemented by capabilities on the device. That’s particularly relevant for IoT, where devices are often deployed in environments that are difficult to access.
In the end, our job is to help customers operate their connected solutions securely while keeping control over their data. That’s what good security should deliver.
Post-quantum cryptography is a worry for devices expected to run for fifteen or twenty years. Are you advising customers to plan for it now, and is it realistic for a constrained device?
Absolutely. I think there’s one important point we shouldn’t overlook: Post-quantum security is not just a topic for the future. It’s already relevant today.
There’s a concept called “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later”. The idea is quite simple. Attackers collect encrypted data today, store it, and potentially decrypt it in the future once sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available.
So even if the encryption is secure today, the information itself might not be secure in ten or fifteen years.
Now, does that mean every connected sensor needs post-quantum cryptography immediately? Of course not.
For many IoT applications, data simply doesn’t need to remain confidential for decades. But think about critical infrastructure, sensitive industrial information or applications where long-term confidentiality really matters. For those use cases, waiting is not a good strategy.
We’re already seeing the industry move. Post-quantum cryptography is no longer just a research topic. It’s being implemented in real-world applications, and we’re seeing developments that make it increasingly relevant for IoT devices as well.
Of course, constrained devices bring their own challenges. Limited processing power, memory, energy consumption and low data rates all have to be considered. But that’s exactly where innovation comes in.
Together with our colleagues at T-Labs and research partners, we’re exploring how post-quantum security can be made practical for resource-constrained IoT devices. Our research focuses on end-to-end, threshold-based trust establishment, combining post-quantum cryptography with secret sharing across multiple terrestrial and satellite communication paths. By distributing security-critical information across different connectivity paths, this approach aims to enhance security and resilience while reducing dependence on any single path.
We’ve already developed a proof of concept and presented our research at European Wireless 2026. Our results demonstrate the technical feasibility of this approach, while further optimization and validation are needed before broader deployment.
We need to distinguish between applications that require quantum-resistant protection today and those that can follow a gradual migration path.
But in both cases, we should build devices and systems that can adapt. Because with IoT devices staying in the field for fifteen or twenty years, waiting until quantum computing becomes a practical threat is simply too late.
Europe is pushing for digital sovereignty. Does it matter for IoT security where a platform is hosted and who builds the modules inside the devices?
Yes, but digital sovereignty involves much more than the location of a data centre. And I think we sometimes make this discussion too simple.
Of course, where your data is stored matters. Who operates the infrastructure matters. The legal framework matters. But let’s look at a typical IoT solution.
You have a device, a communication module, firmware, software, connectivity and a cloud platform. Often, these components come from different companies in different countries.
So, even if your data is hosted in Europe, you still need to ask some important questions.
Do you know what’s running on your devices? Do you understand your dependencies? Can you identify vulnerabilities? Most importantly, can you do something about them?
To me, digital sovereignty means understanding your dependencies and retaining meaningful control over the technology you rely on.
It doesn’t mean that everything has to be developed and manufactured in one country. That wouldn’t reflect the reality of global IoT deployments.
Our customers operate internationally. They manufacture products in one market and deploy them in many others. They need connectivity and security solutions that work across borders.
So I believe we need both: global technology ecosystems and standards for security, transparency and responsibility. This is where Europe has an opportunity.
We can help establish a framework where security is built into connected products from the beginning, where responsibilities are clear and where companies have the tools to manage their devices throughout their lifetime.
Because ultimately, digital sovereignty is not just about where technology comes from.
It is about whether you can understand it, trust it and remain in control of it.

