IndustrialCyber

Dragos finds industrial ransomware attacks rose 11% in Q3 2026, with manufacturing accounting for 69% of victims


Industrial cybersecurity firm Dragos identified continued rise in ransomware activity against industrial organizations, with 1,266 incidents recorded worldwide between July and September, an 11% increase from 1,140 in the previous quarter. It revealed that manufacturing remained the most affected sector, accounting for 876 incidents, or 69% of the total, followed by engineering firms and system integrators supporting OT (operational technology) ecosystem with 116 incidents, and transportation and logistics with 105. The U.S. recorded the highest number of incidents at 473, while India saw the largest increase in Asia, rising from 15 incidents in the second quarter to 38 in the third quarter. 

In its third-quarter 2026 analysis, Dragos attributed increase to continued exploitation of internet-facing edge devices and enterprise applications, stolen credentials and weaknesses in remote access infrastructure, with ransomware operators increasingly stealing data before or instead of encrypting systems. Qilin remained the most active group, claiming 195 industrial victims, followed by The Gentlemen with 167. 

The analysis also found that ransomware incidents disrupted industrial production through attacks on enterprise IT, enterprise resource planning and virtualization systems that support OT operations, even though Dragos observed no cases in which attackers reached the second stage of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain or directly manipulated control systems during the quarter.

“A July ransomware attack on production-related systems at Fairlife, a Coca-Cola dairy subsidiary, suspended production at all four of its U.S. facilities for roughly 11 days,” Abdulrahman H. Alamri and Lexie Mooney, Dragos researchers, wrote in a Monday blog post. “Argentine pipeline operator Oldelval reported that only administrative systems were affected in a July ransomware attack, and crude transport continued. In August, an unattributed cyberattack on medical device manufacturer Boston Scientific halted global manufacturing and shipping for about two weeks.”

They added that ransomware operators continued to rely on a consistent set of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), including exploiting edge devices and enterprise applications, using stolen credentials, and evading endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems. Critical flaws in VMware vCenter and JetBrains TeamCity were exploited within days of disclosure and later tied to ransomware operations. INC Ransom exploited SonicWall SMA 1000 vulnerabilities for initial access. Separately, public reporting in July 2026 linked the FortiBleed campaign, which harvested credentials from more than 86,000 FortiGate devices in June, to INC and Lynx operations. 

After claiming no industrial victims in Q2, Cl0p returned with mass exploitation of PTC Windchill and FlexPLM, claiming engineering and design data from manufacturers without employing encryption, maintaining the data theft trend observed across the ransomware ecosystem. Dragos observed no case in Q3 2026 in which a ransomware operator reached Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain or directly manipulated a control system. 

Alamri and Mooney detailed that Fairlife, the Coca-Cola dairy subsidiary, was the first to be hit in July 2026. Production stopped at all four of its U.S. facilities for roughly eleven days, from the July 16 disclosure until most output resumed on July 27, though Canadian operations were untouched and retail supply held up on existing inventory. In a filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Coca-Cola said an unauthorized third party had accessed part of Fairlife’s systems, including production-related ones. The Anubis ransomware-as-a-service group claimed the attack, saying it had encrypted servers and stolen up to a terabyte of data, and Coca-Cola confirmed that data was taken. The company has not revealed how the attackers got in and does not expect a material financial impact.

Boston Scientific followed in August 2026, with disruption that rippled across manufacturing, order processing, and shipping for about two weeks. The company spotted unauthorized activity on 25 August, when a network outage cut off part of its on-premises IT environment and, with it, the business applications needed to make products and fill orders. By early September, major distribution centers were shipping at or above normal levels and most factories were running again, but the company expects a material hit to its third-quarter and full-year results. 

CrowdStrike’s investigation traced the intrusion to an external-facing network management device and found no evidence of data encryption or of interactive access to manufacturing, maintenance, or SCADA systems. Boston Scientific has not called the incident ransomware, and no group has publicly claimed it.

The third case, also from July 2026, involved Oleoductos del Valle, known as Oldelval, which runs Argentina’s main crude oil pipeline network and carries most of the oil produced in Vaca Muerta. The Gentlemen ransomware group listed the company on its leak site on July 23 and threatened to publish stolen data. A week later, Oldelval told Argentina’s securities regulator that the attack had touched only administrative systems, all of which were restored after its cybersecurity protocols were activated. Crude transport carried on without interruption and the company reported no operational downtime. As with Fairlife, Oldelval has not disclosed the type of threat or how the attackers first gained access.

Ransomware activity against industrial organizations rose in every region in the third quarter of 2026 compared with the second, a sign of how global and persistent the threat has become. North America stayed the hardest hit by a wide margin, while Europe and Asia also climbed above their first- and second-quarter levels.

Alamri and Mooney reported that North America logged 566 incidents, up from 514 in the second quarter. The U.S. alone accounted for 473, or 37% of all incidents worldwide, and manufacturing made up more than 60% of the activity. Europe remained the second-most impacted region with 328 incidents, up from 316, though growth slowed sharply, from 64 additional incidents in the second quarter to just 12 in the third quarter. Germany stayed the second-most impacted country globally with 66 incidents, 74% of them in manufacturing, followed by Italy, France, Spain, and the UK. The Czech Republic stood out, rising from 3 incidents to 12.

Asia recorded 195 incidents, its third consecutive quarterly increase after 137 and 172. India, with 38 incidents, overtook Taiwan as the region’s most impacted country, with victims concentrated in industrial equipment, automotive, and electronics manufacturing. The Gentlemen and Krybit claimed the most Indian victims. South Korea nearly doubled, from 8 incidents to 15, while Thailand fell from 29 to 16.

South America posted the biggest percentage jump among the major regions, up 28% to 82 incidents from 64, with most of the activity in Brazil, Peru, Argentina, and Colombia. The Middle East recorded 53 incidents, up from 44 and back near its Q1 level. Turkey led the region, followed by the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, which had no incidents in Q2. Egypt dropped from 12 incidents to 4.

Smaller regions edged up as well. ANZ observed 23 incidents, up from 19 in both earlier quarters, with Australia accounting for 20 of them. Africa recorded 19, up from 11 and matching its Q1 level, with South Africa climbing from a single incident to 8. Victims were spread across 10 countries, which is consistent with opportunistic targeting rather than a focused campaign.

Manufacturing was the most heavily impacted sector in the third quarter of 2026, with 876 claimed victim organizations across a wide range of subsectors. Its share of all industrial incidents has risen every quarter this year, from 62% in Q1 to 65% in Q2 and 69% in Q3. Construction-related manufacturing and equipment makers were repeatedly targeted, which fits their reliance on ERP systems, distributed locations, and tight project timelines. Construction led the subsector tally with 193 incidents, followed by equipment with 184, food and beverage with 90, electronics with 67, automotive with 53, pharmaceutical with 46, consumer goods with 42, and healthcare with 35. 

The research noted that food and beverage manufacturing rose for the third straight quarter, from 57 to 70 to 90, and pharmaceutical manufacturing more than doubled since Q1, from 19 incidents to 46. Metals moved the other way, falling from 44 incidents in Q1 to 13 in Q3. Chemical and textile each recorded 24 incidents, plastics 18, printing 17, aerospace 13, and recycling 12, while glass, packaging, semiconductor, defense, maritime, paper, and rubber each logged 10 or fewer.

Organizations that directly support operational technology environments, including engineering services, integrators, and ICS equipment manufacturers, experienced 116 ransomware incidents in the quarter, nearly identical to the 117 seen in Q2. ICS engineering firms accounted for 95 of those and rose slightly, while ICS equipment manufacturers, with 21 incidents, recorded their lowest count of the year. Transportation and logistics remain attractive targets because of their dependence on scheduling platforms, reservation systems, fleet management software, and time-sensitive operations, and disruption there often cascades well beyond the victim organization. Of the 105 transportation-related incidents, logistics accounted for 77, maritime for 15, and aviation for 13, while rail saw none.

Government entities accounted for 47 incidents, largely at the municipal and regional level. Electric utilities, with 7 incidents, and water utilities, with 4, continued to appear in ransomware victim disclosures, though at lower volumes than manufacturing and transportation. Oil and natural gas experienced 47 incidents, showing persistent targeting of upstream, midstream, and downstream energy organizations and the service providers that support them. Renewable energy organizations were hit 10 times and mining organizations 19 times, which points to continued adversary interest in energy production and resource extraction environments.

“Dragos’ analysis of Q3 2026 activity shows continued concentration among a small number of established RaaS operations, alongside persistent turnover among smaller and newly appearing brands,” Alamri and Mooney wrote in the post. “The two most active groups, Qilin and The Gentlemen, claimed the greatest number of industrial victims in Q3. Qilin and Akira have consistently ranked as the top operations impacting industrial organizations since March 2025, with Akira falling from the second to fourth spot for the first time in over a year.”

Dragos assesses with high confidence that ransomware will continue to impact industrial organizations globally, and that these intrusions can cascade into OT environments, producing operational downtime, precautionary shutdowns, loss of view, and safety risk even without any ICS-native capability. By examining victimology, sector concentration, observed TTPs, and real-world operational impacts, Dragos provides defenders with insight into the evolving ransomware threat to industrial organizations.

“Risk to industrial organizations in Q3 2026 continued to come from adversaries’ focus on the enterprise IT systems that underpin OT environments, with ransomware operators again causing disruption without any ICS-specific capability,” according to Alamri and Mooney. “ERP systems, virtualization infrastructure, identity services, and remote access gateways are high-value targets because disrupting them cascades quickly into production shutdowns and supply chain impacts. Internet-facing edge devices and enterprise applications remained the dominant entry points into industrial and industrial-adjacent networks, and the time between vulnerability disclosure and exploitation continued to narrow.” 

They added that organizations should assume that all internet-facing assets are discoverable and actively sought by adversaries, making continuous external attack surface management a necessity. “Consistent abuse of compromised credentials and remote management tools, including SimpleHelp, AnyDesk, and QuickAssist, reinforces the need for credential hygiene, MFA on all remote access, rapid patching of edge devices, and strict RMM tooling policies.”



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