The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) identified that federal efforts to strengthen cybersecurity across the food and agriculture sector remain incomplete, leaving gaps in information sharing and emergency preparedness despite growing risks to the nation’s food supply. It said the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had met most cybersecurity-related requirements under the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, but only partially met or failed to meet five requirements. The GAO warned that staffing and resource constraints have created gaps in how the agencies share cyber threats and vulnerabilities, leaving the food supply vulnerable to attacks that could disrupt production and distribution, create unsafe conditions, and erode public confidence.
In its ‘Critical Infrastructure Protection: Further Action Needed to Enhance Cybersecurity of the Food and Agriculture Sector’ report published Thursday, GAO cited the 2021 ransomware attack on a global meat processing company that shut down some of the world’s largest slaughterhouses and contributed to meat shortages in the U.S. and other countries.
GAO reported increased use of technologies to produce food and agricultural products has introduced new potential vulnerabilities into the sector that can be exploited if adequate controls have not been put into place. “For example, failure to implement basic security measures, such as changing default passwords, can be exploited by threat actors. The threat actor could then manipulate data related to food quality, contamination testing, or traceability, potentially resulting in the distribution of unsafe or contaminated food products. This, in turn, can pose significant public health risks that could trigger product recalls and damage the reputation of food producers and suppliers.”
As another example, it also noted that farmers use GPS-guided tractors and real-time soil sensors to improve efficiency, but these technologies can have cybersecurity vulnerabilities when connected to the internet. A cyberattack that takes advantage of these weaknesses, such as by compromising credentials, can then threaten production, leading to food supply chain disruptions. While not every disruption on a farm will lead to supply chain disruption, if a threat actor compromised enough GPS-guided tractors and their data at the same time, it could potentially lead to a disruption of the food supply chain.
Further, while small-scale attacks may only have limited impact, large-scale attacks or those targeting one or two key facilities could carry the potential for hunger and economic devastation across different geographical areas, spanning from local to international levels.
Additionally, cybersecurity attacks can impact processing of food and agricultural products in a way that may cause financial consequences to the victim company. For example, the Food and Ag-ISAC reported in 2024 that a ransomware attack could impact or disrupt processes along agriculture production lines, such as seed production. Any downtime because of an attack could then lead to a chain reaction of delays, potentially causing late planting or harvesting windows. This delay could require crops to be moved to other regions with an active growing season, which is typically only done in cases of severe weather conditions such as flooding.
Ransomware has been the most commonly reported cyberattack type in the food and agriculture (FA) sector since 2021, with the Food and Ag-ISAC recording 167 ransomware incidents in 2023, 206 in 2024, and 295 in 2025. In August 2026, the Food and Ag-ISAC reported 227 ransomware incidents through July 2026 and noted that 2026 is on pace to be one of the highest-volume ransomware years on record for the sector. Most reported attacks sought ransom payments by shutting down food production and distribution systems across small and large companies as well as farms.
While USDA, FDA, and DHS’s 2024 draft sector risk assessment identified cybersecurity incidents and supply chain disruption as top sector concerns, USDA and FDA’s 2024 draft risk management plan noted that owners and operators struggle to accurately assess facility-level threat likelihood, complicating security prioritization and preparation.
The true volume and impact of FA sector cybersecurity incidents extend beyond voluntary public reports, as USDA and FDA lack authority to require sector-wide reporting and have no established voluntary incident-reporting mechanisms, while the Food and Ag-ISAC relies on voluntary member submissions, partner sharing, and open-source reporting, and CISA offers a voluntary reporting mechanism.
Publicly reported attacks between 2021 and 2026, most frequently involving ransomware and business email compromise, have caused costly operational and supply disruptions. Examples include a January 2021 U.S. farm attack via compromised administrator credentials that caused a $9 million production loss; a May 2021 ransomware attack on meat processor JBS that forced slaughterhouse shutdowns in the U.S. and abroad, caused meat supply shortages and a 25% meat price spike, and led to an $11 million bitcoin ransom payment; and a February 2022 business email compromise using nearly identical email domains and real employee names that cost a food manufacturer $600,000 in milk powder and non-fat dry milk.
Additional reported incidents include a March 2022 ransomware attack on a multi-state grain company that disrupted grain processing, seed, fertilizer, and logistics during spring planting preparations; an April 2022 business email compromise impersonating a food company and using a supplier president’s name and a nearly identical email address to cause a $100,000 whole milk powder loss; and a May 2022 ransomware and data exfiltration campaign targeting farming equipment maker AGCO’s websites and U.S. provider sites, halting operations for about two weeks including a tractor assembly facility.
Later examples include an August 2022 business email compromise using a distributor CFO’s name to place a fake order for two truckloads of powdered milk, costing a multinational snack food and beverage company $160,000; a February 2023 ransomware attack on Dole’s legacy servers and end-user computers that shut down production plants, disrupted U.S. grocery supplies, and cost $10.5 million; an April 2023 attack exploiting default passwords and other vulnerabilities in Jordan Valley farm irrigation controllers and Galil Sewage Corporation wastewater treatment controls, damaging controllers on systems not switched from remote to manual operation; and a July 2026 ransomware intrusion into Fairlife’s systems, including production systems, prompting production halts at U.S. plants during a Coca-Cola investigation.
GAO issued five recommendations, three to the Department of Health and Human Services and two to USDA, urging both agencies to fully implement information-sharing and emergency preparedness requirements and assess whether resources should be reprioritized or additional funding requested. HHS agreed with its recommendations, while USDA disagreed with its two recommendations. GAO maintained that all five recommendations are warranted.
The GAO review found that USDA and FDA met most of their cybersecurity responsibilities, though with gaps tied to stalled federal reviews and thin real-time visibility. On sector coordination, the agencies met all three requirements: they serve as day-to-day federal interfaces through joint sector meetings, chair the Government Coordinating Council, and sit on the Federal Senior Leadership Council. They also work with CISA on fact sheets, alerts and advisories.
On risk management, both requirements were met, even though the draft Food and Agriculture Sector Risk Management Plan, submitted to the National Security Council and CISA in early January 2025, remains unfinalized. USDA has received no feedback because Executive Order 14239 ordered a review of the underlying memoranda.
The agencies identified other ways of recommending security measures, including the March 2023 120-Day Food and Agriculture Interim Risk Review and a June 2026 advisory, coordinated with CISA, on hardening automatic tank gauge systems. Both risk assessment requirements were also met. The interim review flagged risks from automation, precision farming and digital agriculture; the agencies assessed potential AI risks, and a draft Sector-Specific Risk Assessment 2024 laid out cybersecurity scenarios, though it too is awaiting review because NSM-22 is paused. FDA also feeds sector vulnerability data into DHS’s national risk assessment efforts.
Information sharing was the weak spot, with three of four requirements met and one only partially met. USDA and FDA facilitate exchange through joint meetings, USDA’s biweekly emails (including a February 2026 alerts roundup) and FDA’s website, and they co-authored advisories such as the December 2022 warning on business email compromise used to steal food shipments. They also help identify sector intelligence needs, pass sector input to CISA, and support DHS’s annual reporting.
The partially met requirement concerns giving CISA and the sector awareness of ongoing and real-time threats, vulnerabilities and mitigations. USDA supplied input for CISA’s June 2026 tank gauge advisory and flagged how widely such gauges are used in agricultural facilities, but the co-SRMAs do not give CISA continuous real-time awareness. FDA has no structured mechanism for continuously collecting cybersecurity data and does not track how sector resources are used, so it is unclear how the agencies would receive and relay real-time threat or vulnerability information.
While USDA and FDA met most Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA) requirements, they reported having limited resources to address critical cybersecurity activities, such as information sharing and cybersecurity emergency preparedness activities. Until USDA and FDA have assessed whether they can reprioritize their resources and staffing, or if they need additional resources to provide more support to meet the SRMA requirements, the FA sector will be more vulnerable to cybersecurity risks and attacks, potentially disrupting the nation’s food and agriculture supply chains and resulting in significant economic and environmental impact.
GAO made five recommendations to strengthen SRMA responsibilities across the two departments, beginning with two directed to the Department of Agriculture. Specifically, the Secretary of Agriculture should ensure that the Director of the Office of Homeland Security fully implements SRMA requirements for sharing cybersecurity threat and vulnerability information with CISA, as well as facilitating or conducting cybersecurity emergency preparedness exercises and simulations. Both recommendations call for assessing whether resources should be reprioritized or requested to continuously collect cyber threat information and carry out these preparedness activities.
The remaining three recommendations are directed to the Department of Health and Human Services, urging the Secretary to ensure that the Director of the Food and Drug Administration’s Office of Coordinated Outbreak Response fully implements key SRMA requirements. Like USDA, the FDA office should fulfill obligations to share cybersecurity threat and vulnerability data with CISA and facilitate or conduct emergency preparedness exercises and simulations, evaluating whether to reprioritize or request resources to support both efforts. Additionally, the Secretary should ensure the FDA office fully implements the SRMA requirement to develop planning documents for coordinated action during cybersecurity disasters or emergencies.
GAO concluded that the food and agriculture sector faces rising cybersecurity threats, with past incidents already costing millions of dollars in lost revenue and disrupting the nation’s food supply chain. The risk is amplified by the sector’s growing reliance on internet-connected technologies for producing, harvesting and storing food, which, when poorly secured, can be used to gain illicit access to systems and launch ransomware or supply chain disruption attacks. The sector’s critical dependencies on several other infrastructure sectors make it all the more important that food and agriculture equipment is as secure as possible.
In response, USDA and FDA, as the sector’s co-SRMAs, have taken steps to improve cybersecurity and have met most SRMA requirements. Both agencies, however, reported limited resources for critical activities, such as information sharing and cybersecurity emergency preparedness. GAO warned that until the agencies assess whether they can reprioritize existing resources and staff, or need additional resources, to better meet the SRMA requirements, the sector will remain more vulnerable to attacks. Such attacks could disrupt food and agriculture supply chains and carry significant economic and environmental consequences.


