A new report from Intel 471 disclosed that the manufacturing sector remained a prime target for cybercriminals in 2026, accounting for 1,379 recorded ransomware and data extortion claims, or 16.8% of all monitored victims globally, between January and October. The industrial products and services industry represented 74.2% of the manufacturing claims, followed by chemicals and specialty materials at 11.5%, automotive at 11.3%, and aerospace and defense at 3%. The Qilin, The Gentlemen and Akira ransomware groups were the most active, accounting for 13.6%, 12.9% and 8.4%, respectively, of the monitored manufacturing victims.
The report, ‘From Aerospace to Assembly Lines: How Cybercriminals Are Targeting Manufacturing Supply Chains,’ also found that initial access brokers (IABs) offered unauthorized access affecting 172 manufacturing entities from January to October 2026, representing 10% of the worldwide access offers tracked by Intel 471. Vulnerability exploitation accounted for 25% of the examined access cases, while brute-force attacks represented 16.3%.
Additionally, small and medium-sized manufacturers faced disproportionate pressure, with about 68% of monitored ransomware and data extortion victim claims involving organizations with annual revenues below US$50 million.
Given the sector’s immense economic concentration and zero-tolerance threshold for operational downtime, manufacturing emerges as an exceptionally lucrative target for extortion.
“Interconnecting enterprise IT with plant floor operational technology (OT) has weakened traditional boundary defenses, exposing inherently insecure legacy controllers and assembly systems to enterprise-level threat vectors and lateral movement,” Intel 471 reported. “Financially motivated adversaries actively weaponize this exposure, knowing that halting an assembly or processing line costs millions of dollars per day and creates immense pressure for rapid extortion payouts. Concurrently, the sector’s reliance on multi-tier supply chains introduces critical third-party risk, where a compromise at an interconnected vendor, logistics partner or maintenance contractor provides adversaries with a trusted pivot into core networks or can trigger cascading cross-site operational shutdowns.”
Furthermore, the risk of having high-value IP leaked or auctioned across illicit underground channels exposes proprietary technical data to competitors, irreversibly devalues years of research and development (R&D) investments and provides threat actors with powerful extortion leverage to compel ransom payments. For the manufacturing sector, cybersecurity is not merely a data protection issue, but an existential operational risk
The report identified a key enabler of unauthorized access as the proliferation of IABs (initial access brokers), who are threat actors or groups that specialize in compromising networks via brute-force attacks, malware logs, vulnerability exploits and social engineering. “After gaining a foothold, IABs sell the access on underground channels to other threat actors seeking to carry out further attacks.”
“From Jan. 1 to Oct. 29, 2026, our internal data revealed IABs offered unauthorized access that impacted 172 entities in the manufacturing sector, representing about 10% of all accesses offered worldwide,” Intel 471 disclosed. “Manufacturing was the fifth most targeted sector behind professional services and consulting; public; consumer and industrial products; and technology, media and telecommunications. The five most impacted countries in descending order were the U.S., India, Italy, France and Spain.”
Furthermore, the five most prominent IABs identified during this period were the actors using the Pirat-Networks, Anon-WMG, Tamburino, IntegraGT and Saturned33 handles. Intel 471 categorized 66.8% of this access as wholesale offers involving multiple targets, while the remaining 33.2% was categorized as access to a specified target.
The report also analyzed advertised access targeting organizations operating in the manufacturing sector to understand how adversaries obtained their initial foothold. IABs gained initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities in 25% of the cases we examined, while they used brute-force techniques in 16.3% of cases.
“Actors obtained 10.5% of the advertised access through compromised credentials whose origin was not identified, while information stealers supplied the credentials used to obtain 0.6% of the access,” according to Intel 471. “We could not establish an acquisition method for 47.6%. Although the available information does not describe every compromise in equal detail, it demonstrates that vulnerability exploitation remains a substantial source of access targeting manufacturing organizations, alongside access obtained through credential compromise.”
The researchers assessed that gaps in identifying and remediating vulnerable internet-facing applications may help sustain this supply of access. Delays in applying available patches are one possible contributor, but the researchers could not determine whether a fix was available in each case or how quickly organizations responded.
“Access offers across the manufacturing sector are typically categorized by claimed corporate revenue, administrative permissions, host volume and access type. Analyzing the specific access mechanism is critical, as the compromised technology dictates an adversary’s initial foothold, privilege level and potential lateral reach into production environments,” Intel 471 reported. “While observed entry vectors spanned remote monitoring and management (RMM) utilities such as AnyDesk and BeyondTrust, remote shells deployed on vulnerable edge systems and information stealer-infected endpoints, perimeter remote access accounted for the majority of access listings.”
Also, virtual private network (VPN) services represented the largest share at 28.5% of examined cases, followed by Microsoft Remote Desktop Web Access (RDWeb) at 9.9%, file transfer protocol (FTP) servers at 7.6% and remote desktop protocol (RDP) hosts at 6.4%.
Manufacturing was the most targeted sector in ransomware and data extortion activity during the reporting period, with 1,379 recorded claims, or 16.8% of all monitored victims, according to Intel 471’s tracking of leak sites. Operators either buy access from initial access brokers or break in directly, then widen their foothold to stage extortion demands, often pairing data theft with system encryption, though sometimes skipping the encryption. Victims face downtime and the threat of stolen files going public. Industrial products and services made up 74.2% of the activity, followed by chemicals and specialty materials (11.5%), automotive (11.3%) and aerospace and defense (3%).
The U.S. led in victim counts, ahead of Germany, Canada, Italy and France. The headline-grabbing multimillion-dollar demands against giant corporations tell only part of the story, since the bulk of the damage landed on small and mid-sized manufacturers. Among victims with revenue estimates (about 66% of the total), firms earning $10–50 million were the largest group at 399, followed by 189 in the $5–10 million bracket, while only 66 victims topped $1 billion.
The pattern suggests attackers choose targets by how easy the access is and how little effort the intrusion takes, not by company size. These smaller players often serve as niche component makers and tier suppliers inside tightly woven production chains, bound by strict delivery contracts and often without a dedicated security team. That combination hands extortionists leverage: with downtime unaffordable, many pay mid-tier demands quickly rather than risk halting a supply line.
Automotive threat activity captured by Intel 471 centered on the supply chain. In May 2026, the actor zestix advertised a dataset allegedly exfiltrated from Taiwan-based electronics manufacturer Pegatron Corp., reportedly a key supplier to EV maker Lucid Motors. The offer described 416 unencrypted files totaling about 4.65 GB of engineering specifications and production assets tied mainly to Lucid’s Gravity and Air programs. The actor stressed that the data was technical intellectual property rather than customer records or PII, and framed it for direct use in CAD environments such as SolidWorks and CATIA.
It allegedly included production CAD schematics and board layouts for high-voltage and electronic architectures, among them the Gravity’s AC junction box, center information displays and instrument clusters, along with board-level schematics, Gerber files and pick-and-place data for the telematics control unit and layout files for the SVCU 2.0 module supporting ADAS. It also reportedly held engineering statements of work, preliminary bills of materials, PCBA designs, validation protocols adhering to LV-124 and IPC-A-610 standards, diagnostic statements of work, UDS reprogramming guides, supplier quality documentation and internal cybersecurity specifications.
On Aug. 8, 2026, the SovCali data extortion group listed Lucid Group Inc. on its DLS, and on Aug. 21, 2026, Lucid confirmed in an official statement that one of its vendors had suffered a cybersecurity event. The company said the vendor lacked access to customer databases or systems capable of interfering with vehicle operations or core business functions, that production and retail activities were unaffected, and that it was working with third-party investigators and law enforcement to protect its intellectual property and pursue legal remedies.
Intel 471 noted that a link between zestix and SovCali remains unconfirmed, but said the episode exemplifies the lifecycle of supply chain extortion in modern manufacturing, where an intrusion at an upstream technology supplier gave adversaries immediate access to proprietary design data.
Elsewhere in the sector, the picture was similarly varied. In industrial products and services, Intel 471 examined activity including purported supplier portal compromise, attempted movement into internal systems and ransomware-associated data theft.
In May 2026, Taiwan-based Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd., doing business as Foxconn, suffered a major breach attributed to the Nitrogen ransomware group. The company acknowledged the incident and said attacks affected several of its manufacturing facilities in North America. The group allegedly exfiltrated 8 TB of data, including internal project documentation, technical drawings and schematics related to multiple billion-dollar clients, and posted samples as proof.
In chemicals and specialty materials, which Intel 471 tracked across manufacturers and distributors, including alleged employee endpoint compromise and attempted sales of corporate network access, the firm reported in October 2026 that the actor Marge was actively recruiting social engineering specialists to obtain initial network access for downstream ransomware operations. That activity was linked to alleged employee endpoint access at Wanhua Chemical.
Intel 471 highlighted the risks posed by interconnected supply chains, where compromises involving vendors, logistics partners, or maintenance contractors can provide attackers with pathways into manufacturing networks and potentially disrupt operations across multiple sites. Deeply integrated supply chains add another opening, since breaching an upstream electronics supplier or engineering contractor yields the design files and operational data needed to extort the downstream enterprise without ever touching the OEM directly.
The report does not expect any major shift in the threat landscape for financially motivated adversaries targeting manufacturers. Attacks on the sector will stay at elevated rates, with extortion campaigns concentrated opportunistically on small and mid-sized manufacturers.
Ransomware and data extortion operators see middle market firms, tied to strict just-in-time production schedules and thin operating margins, as sources of faster, less-resisted payouts. They exploit that fragility through multi-layered extortion, pairing the threat of mounting losses from halted assembly or processing lines with the theft and auctioning of proprietary intellectual property such as CAD schematics, circuit board layouts and specialized chemical formulations. The model is amplified by fragile perimeter architectures and legacy OT environments: IABs and extortion groups routinely exploit exposed perimeter networking appliances, vendor-managed remote access gateways and compromised O&M credentials, and once inside, legacy OT assets that often lack native audit logging, automated patching or modern authentication leave control environments highly exposed.
To counter this, Intel 471 says manufacturers must move beyond perimeter-only defenses toward structural operational decoupling and proactive threat visibility. Industrial enterprises and their suppliers should enforce strict segmentation between corporate IT and plant floor OT, require multifactor authentication on all external vendor access pathways, and place hardware-level compensating controls around unpatchable brownfield controllers.
Cyber threat intelligence programs should extend into underground channels to catch early signs of activity. Incident response playbooks, meanwhile, need to account for third-party supply chain exposure, with enforceable vendor security standards and crisis management protocols designed to sustain minimum viable production during enterprise IT outages.


