Google’s Threat Intelligence Group and Mandiant report that the Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group Cold Relic successfully targeted high-value entities, including government officials, defense contractors and non-governmental organizations across Europe and North America, by chaining cloud compromises together. Rather than relying solely on initial technical exploits, the group harvests staff directories, email archives and internal documents from an initial breach to impersonate trusted contacts and infiltrate connected organizations and professional networks.
In two intrusions involving U.S.-based organizations in late 2025 and 2026, Cold Relic stole credentials, exploited multi-factor authentication (MFA) push-notification fatigue and maintained access through rogue authentication devices, passkeys and backup codes. The group downloaded cloud-stored files, employee directories and email archives, then used information from the earlier breach to impersonate an employee and target a second organization.
For critical infrastructure and other high-value sectors, the findings highlight how a single cloud identity compromise can spread across partner ecosystems and multi-cloud environments. Cold Relic uses stolen credentials, MFA fatigue, rogue passkeys and residential proxies to evade detection and maintain access, turning legitimate business communications and organizational data into entry points for subsequent intrusions.
“COLD RELIC is a Russian state-sponsored threat group that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) has assessed operates within Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB),” Josh Murchie, John Wolfram, Joseph Spero, Peter Ukhanov, Fernando Tomlinson, Jr., and Wesley Shields wrote in a Google Threat Intelligence Group blog post. “The group is known for implementing sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns with the aim to gain access to information of strategic or political relevance to the Russian government, as well as to leverage compromised access to target compromised individuals’ broader social and professional networks.”
They added that once the group compromises a target, it uses stolen emails and data to establish authentic pretexts and impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets. “While COLD RELIC has largely maintained a low profile, yielding minimal public reporting relative to other Russia-nexus threat actors, it has been highly successful at compromising high-value targets (including government officials, defense contractors, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) across Europe and North America) while maintaining a consistent operational tempo.”
Over more than a decade of tracking Cold Relic alongside Mandiant incident response investigations, the researchers have seen the group continually refine how it uses data stolen in one breach to infiltrate downstream targets. In late 2025, Cold Relic stole large amounts of names, email addresses, and email archives from a U.S.-based organization, and in 2026, Mandiant investigated a follow-on intrusion at a second U.S. organization where the group likely exploited that stolen contact and relationship context to launch its attack.
To execute these campaigns, Cold Relic routes targets through compromised websites to conceal its phishing infrastructure and screen visitors, using customized links that often reference a prior victim or lure topic. During the 2026 investigation, Mandiant found that operators reached out over an encrypted messaging app while impersonating an employee from the first victim organization, a connection corroborated by a phishing link submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026 that directly referenced that first victim.
Two intrusions attributed to Cold Relic, tracked by GTIG, show how patient and socially fluent a modern identity-focused intruder can be. In the first, late-2025 case, operators routed through a residential proxy close to the victim’s location, logged in with stolen credentials of a Super Admin account and wore down a user with MFA push fatigue until one request was approved. From there, the group registered a device the tenant had never seen and layered in passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices to keep the door open.
With Super Admin power, it pulled the organization’s entire cloud drive by mass-sharing files to its own mailbox and downloading them directly, exported the full employee list and launched a tenant-wide Customer Takeout, an administrative export that is logged in the Admin audit logs. It also checked what defenders could see by querying security investigation and email audit logs, then viewed, edited and deleted Alert Center notifications to scrub evidence of the break-in.
The sting came afterward. Cold Relic stayed inside for several months, syncing inboxes over OAuth to external email clients and returning through attacker-enrolled passkeys that survived password and session resets and sidestepped device registration controls. Once removed, the group did not retreat but pivoted, using email accounts that impersonated the victim’s employees to run fresh social engineering against colleagues and peers in the same professional circles. That pivot fed the second intrusion, where operators moved with ease across a multi-cloud, federated setup.
Posing as a person from the first victim’s organization, they struck up a conversation on a secure messaging app with an employee of another U.S. organization that used Microsoft Entra ID as its single sign-on provider for Google Workspace. Phishing links, which harvested Entra ID credentials and tokens while redirecting to document lures that matched the chat, led to a new MFA device being registered and a bulk download of the victim’s cloud files. The lesson is that one breach can become the credibility for the next, and that persistence often lives in the quiet places, such as enrolled passkeys and backup factors, that routine password resets never touch.
“After gaining initial access to an organization, COLD RELIC registers rogue MFA devices, passkeys, and MFA backup codes to establish long-term persistence. Once persistence is secured, COLD RELIC conducts aggressive data collection and exfiltration operations, accessing email, chat, and cloud storage repositories,” the researchers detailed.
While Cold Relic’s primary objective post-compromise is mass collection and download of files and email archives, it simultaneously performs targeted queries for specific terms of interest. In particular, Cold Relic searches for credentials, personnel information, email archives (.pst files), and documents related to their collection requirements. Additionally, Cold Relic seeks out data that can support subsequent spear-phishing operations, including organizational rosters, contact lists, resumes, and event schedules to build convincing pretexts for future targets.
Beyond seeking out data to support subsequent operations, Cold Relic also appeared to repurpose the account used in Case Study 2 for follow-on targeting. After the compromise, the encrypted messaging application used for the initial approach recorded that the threat actor changed their profile name to a completely new person.
GTIG believes this new persona was likely used to continue to target other organizations in the same professional circles in a similar manner to both of the cases documented here.
In conclusion, Cold Relic’s campaigns demonstrate the convergence of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse. By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners. Their ability to navigate across multiple cloud ecosystems highlights that organizations must defend their entire identity estate holistically. GTIG will continue to track, disrupt, and expose Cold Relic infrastructure to protect global cloud users.
To counter Cold Relic’s evasion and persistence tactics, GTIG recommends hardening defenses across identity, session management, and network layers. Because the group masks its activity using geographically localized residential proxies to bypass impossible-travel alerts, organizations should enrich authentication logs with proxy and VPN reputation feeds, alert on sudden residential ASN shifts for privileged accounts, and block logons from known proxy networks.
To prevent attackers from pivoting via stored secrets or maintaining access after a password reset, defenders should enforce phishing-resistant FIDO2/WebAuthn MFA, strictly audit and restrict new passkey or MFA device registrations, deploy cross-cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) policies to block sensitive file storage and mass external sharing, and pair password resets with the immediate revocation of active sessions, refresh tokens, and unauthorized third-party OAuth app grants.


