
North Korean hackers reached a dangerous milestone in 2025, stealing a record-breaking $2.02 billion in cryptocurrency throughout the year.
This represents a 51% increase from 2024, pushing their total theft since 2016 to $6.75 billion.
The alarming trend shows that despite carrying out fewer attacks, these state-sponsored groups are achieving much larger payouts through carefully planned operations.
The cryptocurrency industry witnessed over $3.4 billion in total theft during 2025, with North Korean operations accounting for 76% of all service compromises.
These hackers achieved these massive results by using two main strategies. First, they embedded IT workers inside crypto exchanges, custodians, and web3 companies to gain trusted access.
Second, they started using fake recruiter schemes, pretending to represent major web3 and AI companies to trick employees during phony job interviews and technical screenings.
Chainalysis researchers noted that the attackers are now flipping their traditional approach. Instead of just applying for jobs, they are impersonating recruiters and conducting fake hiring processes designed to steal credentials, source code, and VPN access from victims’ current employers.
At higher levels, they pose as strategic investors or business acquirers, using pitch meetings and fake due diligence to gather sensitive system information and find ways into valuable infrastructure.
The February 2025 attack on Bybit exchange alone accounted for $1.5 billion, marking one of the largest single cryptocurrency thefts in history.
This incident perfectly demonstrates how North Korean groups are shifting from many small attacks to fewer but much more damaging operations.
The ratio between the largest hacks and typical incidents has now crossed 1,000 times for the first time ever.
Sophisticated Laundering Operations and Detection Patterns
After stealing funds, North Korean hackers follow a clear 45-day laundering cycle that security teams can track.
The process happens in three distinct waves. During the first five days, they immediately move stolen funds through DeFi protocols, which see a 370% spike in activity, and mixing services that jump 135%.
This creates the first layer of confusion for investigators trying to trace the money. Between days six and ten, the strategy changes.
They start using exchanges with limited identity checks and cross-chain bridges to move assets between different blockchains.
Centralized exchanges receive 32% more funds during this period, while mixing services continue operating at reduced intensity.
This represents the critical transition where stolen funds begin moving toward potential cash-out points.
The final phase from days 20 to 45 focuses on converting cryptocurrency to real money. No-KYC exchanges see 82% increases, while Chinese-language guarantee services like Tudou Danbao experience 87% jumps.
Chainalysis analysts identified that North Korean groups show a strong preference for Chinese-language money laundering services, with usage rates up to 1,753% higher than other cybercriminals.
They structure their payments differently too, keeping 60% of transfers below $500,000 to avoid detection, while other hackers prefer larger transactions between $1 million and $10 million.
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This distinctive pattern reveals operational limits facing North Korean actors. Their heavy reliance on specific Chinese-language services and over-the-counter traders suggests tight integration with criminal networks across the Asia-Pacific region.
These consistent preferences give law enforcement and security teams clear detection opportunities to identify and potentially intercept stolen funds before they disappear completely into the global financial system.
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