HelpnetSecurity

Russian spies turn one cloud breach into a stepping stone for the next


A Russian cyberespionage group is posing as employees of organizations it has already breached to phish new targets, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) found.

Google tracks the group as COLD RELIC (also known as Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear), and the US Department of Justice has assessed that it operates within Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).

COLD RELIC goes after government officials, defense contractors and NGOs in Europe and North America.

“The group is known for implementing sophisticated phishing and malware campaigns with the aim to gain access to information of strategic or political relevance to the Russian government, as well as to leverage compromised access to target compromised individuals’ broader social and professional networks,” researchers wrote.

The report’s authors say the group has drawn less public attention than other Russian groups while still breaking into high-value targets. “Once COLD RELIC compromises a target, it uses stolen emails and data to establish authentic pretexts and impersonate contacts when reaching out to subsequent targets,” they added.

A Super Admin account and a flood of MFA prompts

The first intrusion began with stolen credentials for a Super Admin account. The attackers logged in through a US residential proxy close to the victim’s location, so the sign-ins would not trigger alerts for impossible travel, and kept sending MFA push requests until the account holder approved one.

With admin rights in hand, they downloaded the contents of the organization’s entire cloud drive, exported employee lists and started a domain-wide data export through Google Workspace Customer Takeout. They searched the audit logs to see what defenders could see, and “viewed, modified, and deleted Alert Center notifications to remove forensic evidence of the initial intrusion.”

To keep their access, they enrolled passkeys, MFA backup codes and MFA devices of their own. They stayed inside for several months. During that time they synced inboxes to outside email clients, and their passkeys “persisted across password and session resets and bypassed device registration controls.”

Some employees had stored passwords in the company’s cloud storage, which made the damage worse. The attackers used those to get into other accounts, including employees’ personal accounts, “which are typically unmonitored by their employers.”

Even after the organization removed the intruders, GTIG observed COLD RELIC send phishing emails from accounts posing as its employees to their colleagues and to people in the same professional circles.

A familiar name on an encrypted messaging app

In 2026, someone posing as an employee of the first victim contacted a person at a second US organization over an encrypted messaging app. Partway through the conversation, the attacker shared phishing links.

“These phishing links, designed to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID, redirected the victim to document lures relevant to the ongoing conversation in order to avoid raising suspicion. Upon successful authentication using the stolen credentials, COLD RELIC registered and used a new MFA device in the SSO solution to retain access to the user account throughout the intrusion,” they explained.

“By impersonating someone known in the same professional circles as the new target, COLD RELIC increased their chance of phishing success.”

The group’s phishing links tied the two cases together. COLD RELIC usually sends targets through a compromised website that checks each visitor before passing them on to the phishing domain, and the attacker often adds a link parameter that names a previous victim or the lure. A redirector URL from the second intrusion was submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026, and its parameter referenced the first victim organization.

After the break-in, the attacker changed their profile name on the messaging app “to a completely new person.” GTIG believes the new persona was probably used to approach other organizations in the same circles.

Password resets weren’t enough

In at least one case, a victim spotted the intrusion and reset the passwords on affected accounts. COLD RELIC had hijacked sessions that were never revoked, so it kept its access, and Google warns that “password changes alone are insufficient.”

“COLD RELIC’s campaigns demonstrate the convergence of human-centric social engineering and cloud identity abuse. By obtaining access to strategic personnel rosters and operational documents, Russian intelligence services turn legitimate business communications into attack vectors against trusted partners. Their ability to navigate across multiple cloud ecosystems highlights that organizations must defend their entire identity estate holistically,” Google concluded.



Source link