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SANSAR Linux Cryptomining Malware Uses Modified NVIDIA Library to Hide GPU Activity


Ravie LakshmananNov 16, 2026United States

A financially motivated threat activity cluster tracked as REF3364 has been attributed to a Linux-focused cryptocurrency mining operation that tampers with the readings used to detect high GPU workloads.

Central to the intrusion is a toolkit called SANSAR, a Rust-based orchestrator that receives commands over the TOR anonymity network to manage CPU and GPU miners. The activity was observed in late October 2026.

“The threat actor also deployed a kernel rootkit to hide selected processes and files, an NVIDIA Management Library (NVML) wrapper to falsify GPU readings, and a separate backdoor named netns,” Elastic Security Labs said in a report published last week.

“This backdoor retrieves its C2 [command-and-control] address from an Ethereum smart contract before connecting to the server directly.”

In the attack chain documented by the company, initial access is said to have been achieved via an exposed Ray job agent, allowing the threat actor to execute commands. This includes jobs running the NVIDIA System Management Interface (nvidia-smi) to capture and exfiltrate the GPU inventory to an external server.

Subsequently, the attacker submitted a Python reverse shell job that connected to a remote listener, after which an SSH key was added to that account’s authorized_keys file to establish persistent access.

“After obtaining root, the actor staged the toolkit under /opt/vadi_, built the acpi_thermal_mgr kernel module through Dynamic Kernel Module Support (DKMS) and added an initramfs loader,” security researcher Salim Bitam said.

Cybersecurity

“An initramfs is a temporary root file system loaded into RAM during early boot, before Linux switches to its normal root filesystem. The module and loader are stored in the boot image on disk, so the rootkit can load again when the host boots with that image.”

The installation also delivers a modified NVML wrapper that filters process information and changes GPU telemetry to evade detection. Specifically, the altered wrapper hooks NVML calls used by monitoring tools such as nvidia-smi to report GPU utilization as 0%. In addition, temperature and power readings are substituted with random values between 36 to 46 degree Celsius (96.8 to 114.8 degree Fahrenheit) and 100 to 200 watts.

Also delivered are the following payloads –

  • sansar, used for TOR C2, launching or stopping the miner, miner configuration updates, connection management, spawning interactive shells, launching an IPv4 TCP SYN traffic task against a specified address and port, and NVML-hook maintenance
  • kurt (XMRig version 6.25.0), the miner selected by sansar’s CPU branch
  • tilki (SRBMiner-MULTI version 3.6.9), the miner selected by sansar’s GPU branch
  • lyrebird, a legitimate pluggable transport proxy for TOR
  • acpi_thermal_mgr.ko, a Linux rootkit used for process, directory, and socket-list concealment
  • netns, an Ethereum-assisted backdoor

Once launched, SANSAR first performs an anti-debugging check by reading the value of TracerPid and exits if it’s non-zero. TracerPid indicates the Process ID (PID) of the process currently tracing or debugging the target process.

It then reaches out to an onion service (“efxisnqldelyr5ra25oqfrsut54b34g26e7zrsiuupsoekjof2gho2id[.]onion”) for C2 communication via Arti, receiving commands, collecting host and GPU information, and fetching the miner status. The main responsibility of SANSAR is to supervise the mining process and launch the appropriate miner executable based on the miner type (i.e., CPU or GPU) specified in the C2 response message.

Cybersecurity

The “acpi_thermal_mgr.ko” kernel rootkit, on the other hand, uses Function Tracer (ftrace) to conceal cryptomining activity on Linux systems by hiding processes, files, and socket entries.

It achieves this by intercepting system calls to directory listings, file access, and process termination signals, removing matching records or blocking requests for those hidden processes and files by returning the message “No such file or directory” or “No such process.”

The other main component of the operation is the netns backdoor that’s registered as a systemd service. It’s used to retrieve a controller IPv4 address by sending requests to an embedded contract (0x43eb291f56688c63c93e8a93c4591fc997cf6349) and then sets up a plain TCP connection to that address on port 8080 to open a reverse-shell connection to the specified host and port in the C2 response.

It’s not clear who is behind the operation, but Elastic said it found Turkish language comments in the rootkit’s source code.

“Organizations expanding GPU infrastructure for AI and LLM workloads should check who can submit jobs and whether GPU monitoring libraries have been modified, as cryptojacking can divert compute capacity from legitimate workloads and increase operating costs,” Elastic said.



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