Almost every UK council publishes a DMARC policy to stop criminals forging its email, and 60% reject forged mail outright. That is far higher take-up than among German, Austrian and Swiss municipalities, which keep far more of their email at home but enforce control far less often.
That’s according to a scan of 382 UK councils by Ronald Petrlic, professor of IT security at Nuremberg Institute of Technology. It found that 99.7% published a DMARC policy, with a further 35% quarantining failing messages rather than rejecting them. Petrlic’s earlier research across Germany, Austria and Switzerland found 50.7% had published a DMARC policy in Germany, 37.4% in Austria and 55.5% in Switzerland.
Forged council email is a common email compromise and is used to redirect payments, change bank details or harvest staff credentials. A council that publishes no policy, or one set to “none”, cannot stop an attacker sending mail that appears to come from the council domain.
DMARC – Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance – tells receiving servers whether mail claiming to come from a council is genuine, and what to do when it is not. A policy has three settings: none (report only), quarantine (treat as suspicious) and reject (refuse outright). A strict reject – p=reject, applied to all mail – is the only setting that stops a forged council email from reaching a citizen’s inbox.
Even where municipalities in DACH – Germany (D), Austria (A), Switzerland (CH) – publish a policy, few enforce it: just 16.9% reject outright in Germany, 13.4% in Switzerland and 3.3% in Austria.
Germany’s figure also masks a large inactive share: nearly a quarter of its municipalities publish a policy set to none, which asks receivers to report forgery but deliver it anyway, so the share actively blocking mail is lower still.
Britain’s protection sits inside Microsoft 365, the US cloud on which 84.3% of the councils studied depend. Germany keeps its email overwhelmingly at home – 86.9% of municipalities use domestic providers – but leaves its DMARC policy half-built. Austria and Switzerland get the harder combination: concentrated on foreign cloud and weak on enforcement.
“UK councils have adopted email anti-spoofing measures far more widely than their German counterparts,” Petrlic said, “while their email infrastructure is heavily concentrated on Microsoft 365.” The question his work raised, he added, was: “How can councils combine strong email security with supplier choice and resilience?”

Petrlic presents the UK findings for the first time at an email-focused strategy and security event, the London Forum, on 16 November. Full council-level results and an interactive map are due after the event.
The contrast echoes findings from Computer Weekly data dives that mapped central government, the NHS and police forces, which found the same pull towards one provider – and our mapping of councils’ own DNS, which showed the same concentration.
The figures come from Petrlic’s scans of 382 UK authorities, 11,105 German municipalities, 2,092 in Austria and 2,109 in Switzerland. “Publish” means a domain has a DMARC record. “Strict reject” means its policy blocks failing mail outright. The UK figure counts policies that do this for all mail; the German, Austrian and Swiss figures use the same measure from a peer-reviewed study of those countries that Petrlic co-authored.
That study – presented at an Esorics security workshop this year – puts German adoption at 50.7%. Petrlic’s fuller German set, which adds county-level authorities, puts it at 53.1%. Microsoft shares come from the same study, with Germany’s derived from raw dependency data.
For IT leaders across the public sector, the study highlights the tension that the strongest email controls are often the easiest to buy from a single hyperscaler, while supplier diversity that spreads risk is harder to secure to the same standard.
Britain’s councils show near-universal anti-spoofing is achievable, while Germany’s show supplier independence is achievable. Neither has both. Our investigation into how councils buy and test Microsoft software found buying power is rarely matched by scrutiny. For local government on either side of the Channel, the task is to keep the security it has built, and rebuild the choice it has lost.

