A new report from LevelBlue SpiderLabs identified that cyber operations have become a standard component of geopolitical conflict, with attacks increasingly extending beyond military and government networks to businesses, utilities and critical infrastructure. Examining incidents from late 2025 through November 2026, the data documents how cyber operations have supported military strikes, sustained long-running espionage, disrupted water and food systems, and undermined public trust through the misuse of emergency alert applications. The findings highlight the growing convergence of cyber and conventional warfare, with digital attacks producing physical, financial and societal consequences.
In its 90-page report titled ‘How Cyberwarfare Is Reshaping the Connected World,’ LevelBlue identifies persistent access to telecommunications and critical infrastructure networks as a strategic priority for advanced threat actors, while noting that familiar techniques such as phishing, credential theft and exploitation of exposed systems remain central to cyber operations.
LevelBlue points to intrusions involving all four of Singapore’s major telecommunications operators, attacks affecting U.S. water utilities and European supermarket refrigeration systems, and using emergency-warning applications in Ukraine and Russia to distribute false nuclear and chemical alerts in November 2026. It also examines cyber and space operations conducted alongside U.S. strikes on Iran in February 2026, as well as drone and missile attacks targeting data centers from the Gulf region to Kyiv.
Interestingly, the most significant development is not necessarily emergence of new attack techniques, but expanding objectives and operational roles of familiar ones. Credential theft, phishing, and exploitation of exposed systems and malicious software remain widely used. However, these methods are increasingly combined with persistent espionage, intelligence collection supporting military activity, interference with physical processes, and manipulation of trusted communications.
The November 2026 compromises of emergency-warning applications in Ukraine and Russia, which distributed false nuclear and chemical threat alerts, illustrate how attackers can undermine public confidence without causing physical destruction. Meanwhile, increased abuse of legitimate cloud services, remote-access infrastructure, and connected devices makes malicious activity harder to distinguish from normal operations. Artificial intelligence is also accelerating reconnaissance and the development of offensive tools, although its role in fully autonomous attacks remains less established than some public claims suggest.
These attacks follow the December 2025 attacks against Polish energy infrastructure, which demonstrated potential for destructive interference with industrial control systems, while the U.S. publicly acknowledged using cyber capabilities to disrupt Iranian communications and sensors during the opening military strikes in February 2026. At the same time, attacks affecting commercial organizations, including Stryker, and water utilities in the U.S. highlighted how geopolitical tensions and weaknesses in critical infrastructure can translate into operational disruption, financial losses, and wider economic consequences. Not every such incident has a proven connection to a state or conflict, making reliable attribution an important part of understanding the threat.
Recent state-linked espionage and influence campaigns increasingly abuse the legitimate functions of trusted services instead of defeating their security. In March 2026, Dutch intelligence agencies warned that Russian state-linked operators were targeting Signal and WhatsApp accounts of government officials and military personnel, impersonating support staff to coax out verification codes and then abusing legitimate device-linking features, with no break in encryption required.
LevelBlue notes that the technique is old but now carries higher stakes, because a single compromised account, session, app permission or added device can unlock far more connected services and sensitive data, and the resulting activity can look like ordinary authorized access. Detection therefore leans less on spotting malware and more on scrutinizing authentication events, device registrations and application permissions. The same trust is being exploited to sway behavior: during the February 2026 strikes on Iran, the BadeSaba prayer app and several Iranian news sites were compromised to push surrender messages to military personnel, while a March 2026 fake Red Alert app spread Android spyware through spoofed Home Front Command texts, with possible but unconfirmed links to Arid Viper.
On Nov. 1 and 2, emergency warning apps in Ukraine and Russia were separately compromised to send false nuclear, chemical and missile alerts, prompting corrections from authorities, though the operators and any link between the incidents remain unconfirmed. Such cases aim to sow confusion and erode confidence rather than destroy systems, risks that availability or data-loss metrics fail to capture.
Alongside this, automation and AI are speeding operations.
In September 2026, Google Threat Intelligence Group described attackers moving from task-level AI use to broader automation, including an AI-assisted credential-harvesting operation built within six hours of a cloud compromise and attempts to manipulate AI coding assistants and security tools in supply chain attacks. The evidence still does not show autonomous AI replacing human operators, who continue to choose targets and interpret intelligence, but familiar attacks can now run faster and at greater scale, shrinking the window to detect and contain intrusions.
Flagging the growing threat to food preservation, LevelBlue identified that the refrigeration equipment involved included connected refrigeration management systems from Danfoss and other manufacturers, and investigations pointed to exposed management interfaces, outdated products, weak authentication and poor isolation from the public internet, with external contractors often maintaining installations and leaving store owners with little visibility into how they were connected. Contemporary reporting put French losses alone in the tens of millions of euros, and the concerns include food availability, disruption to local suppliers and unsafe products reaching the market if temperature failures go unnoticed, while discarding affected food reduces that risk but adds economic loss and waste. While no reliable public attribution exists, the attacks should not be presented as confirmed state-sponsored cyberwarfare.
LevelBlue stresses that a once-minor technical component can become the point where an intrusion causes physical and financial harm, a problem shared by water utilities, small power generators, cold-storage facilities and grain-management systems, whose operational importance often exceeds the security attention they receive. Protecting essential services therefore means understanding the connected equipment that physical operations depend on, controlling remote maintenance access, and ensuring operators can spot unsafe changes and recover control before a compromise becomes a public safety problem.
The report also notes the reverse of the usual cyberwarfare relationship, in which conventional weapons are increasingly used against the physical infrastructure that makes digital services possible. Data centers, telecommunications facilities, server infrastructure and logistics platforms have become important economic assets, some supporting military and government operations, so infrastructure once seen as primarily commercial is increasingly exposed to the consequences of armed conflict.
Ukraine offered early examples of logistics targeting: on August 28, 2025, a Russian missile strike damaged a Nova Post sorting facility in Kyiv, injuring three employees and causing delivery delays, though parcels were not damaged, and in January 2026 further strikes destroyed a Nova Post cargo terminal near Kharkiv, damaging postal operations and killing four employees. Nova Post described the facility as civilian infrastructure used to distribute food, medicines, humanitarian aid and ordinary goods.
These incidents show how physical attacks can interrupt services that depend on sophisticated digital sorting, inventory management and distribution networks, with the harm coming not from compromising software but from destroying the infrastructure, equipment and workforce needed to keep those services running.
Looking toward 2027, LevelBlue warns that organizations cannot rely on prevention alone against an evolving cyberwarfare landscape. Its report notes that while artificial intelligence accelerates offensive operations, organizations must separate documented capabilities from hype, verify confirmed attacks against unsubstantiated claims, and accurately attribute activity across blurred lines of state-sponsored groups, hacktivists, and cybercriminals. To build resilience, LevelBlue recommends prioritizing exposure reduction across operational technology (OT), remote access, identity security, supplier networks, and recovery planning.
Developments in 2025 and 2026 show cyberwarfare expanding beyond military and government targets into civilian infrastructure, commercial operations, and essential digital services.
“Cyber capabilities now support conventional military operations, intelligence gathering, industrial disruption, and information manipulation. At the same time, physical attacks against data centers, telecommunications, and logistics infrastructure have exposed the growing vulnerability of the digital economy,” according to the report. “The most significant change lies in the expanding objectives and consequences of established attack techniques. Credential theft, phishing, exploitation of exposed systems and malicious software remain common, but their use increasingly extends to military reconnaissance, and interference with physical processes.”
Recent incidents in energy, water, and refrigeration systems demonstrate how flaws in connected equipment trigger widespread operational and economic damage. Because not every wartime attack constitutes cyberwarfare, organizations must shift from defending isolated networks to detecting interference early, maintaining essential services, and containing technical incidents before they escalate into broader societal crises.


