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North Korean IT Workers Create Fake Construction Company and Use AI Deepfakes to Target U.S. Businesses


A suspected North Korean remote worker used a fake Virginia construction company and an apparent real-time AI face swap to pursue contracts with U.S. businesses.

The company, The Great House, advertised residential and commercial construction and engineering services from Lynchburg. Silent Push assessed that the operation sought to generate revenue for North Korea.

Its investigation covered one front company and two calls with its operator; the report identified no awarded contracts or payments.

North Korean IT Workers Create Fake Construction Company

Analysts traced thegreathouse[.]us through a WHOIS registrant pivot, searching domain registration records for an email address on a publicly reported list of roughly 1,400 addresses attributed to North Korean IT workers.

The search for devtop0109[@]gmail[.]com returned one domain, registered on October 18, 2025. Researchers also examined historical web scans and the company’s LinkedIn presence.

The site claimed more than a decade in business, over 200 clients, and more than 60,000 square feet built. The domain’s age did not disprove those claims, but it gave procurement teams a reason to verify the portfolio independently.

threat researcher, “SttyK,” posted a list of 1,400 email addresses (Source: silentpush)

The contact page exposed a discrepancy between the rendered text and the underlying HTML. It displayed a Virginia number with a 434 area code, but its tel: hyperlink pointed to an Arkansas number with a 479 area code.

The domain registration listed a third number with a Massachusetts 351 area code and a New York address. Posing as prospective clients, analysts contacted the Telegram account listed on the site.

A man calling himself “Edward” kept his camera off throughout the first call, which lasted around 25 minutes, and resisted identity verification.

Edward enabled video for the second call. Analysts observed visible layering and facial distortions they described as “folding,” both consistent with a live facial overlay. He repeatedly kept his mouth out of frame, and the artifacts became clearer when he leaned back.

He declined to pass a hand in front of his face and soon cut the video feed. That occlusion test briefly blocks part of the face, which can expose compositing errors in real-time deepfake video.

Silent Push compared the front with Contagious Interview’s malware delivery campaigns, which used fake consulting firms and malicious repositories to deliver BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, and OtterCookie to job seekers.

The Great House reversed the pitch: it presented itself as a vendor seeking paid work rather than an employer recruiting developers. Analysts observed no malware delivery.

The case also differs from FAMOUS CHOLLIMA’s U.S. laptop farms, where domestic facilitators hosted employer-issued devices that overseas workers controlled remotely.

For procurement teams, the strongest check is independent verification. Silent Push recommends confirming contractor licenses directly with state licensing boards and reconciling business addresses and phone numbers against registration records before onboarding.

During video calls, reviewers can ask representatives to turn sideways or briefly obscure their faces, then watch for distorted edges or lip movements that fall out of sync with speech.

A refusal warrants further review, not attribution. U.S. organizations can report suspected North Korean remote-worker activity to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3).

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